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PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY: TORT LAW'S
INFLUENCE IN DEFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
Jill Wieber Lens*
The proper limitations on a punitive damage award depend on the
conception of punitive damages. Is the award a private law remedy,
limited to resolving the dispute between the parties? Or is it a public law
remedy, capable of addressingpublic harm and achieving public good?
The Supreme Court has not waveredfrom public law ideas of punitive
damages-thatthe damages serve the state's interests and are similarto
criminal punishments. At the same time, the Court's holdings also
indicate a private law idea by focusing on the actual injury to the
plaintiff This focus included prohibiting punitive damages from
punishing the defendantfor causing harm to nonparties.
This Article examines tort law's influence in defining the
constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards, an influence that
mandates a private law conception of punitive damages. Tort law lacks
the ability to punish unless liability exists and liability exists only if the
defendant caused an injury. Tort law's capability to punish is similarly
limited to punishing the defendant only for causing the injury that is the
basis of liability. Consistent with tort law's influence, punitive damages
cannot constitutionally punish the defendant for the public harm the
conduct caused Also consistent with tort law's influence, punitive
damage awards must be personalized to the individual dispute despite
the Court's recent concerns regardingunpredictability.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. J.D., University of Iowa
College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank Todd Pettys, Dan
Markel, Luke Meier, and Josh Lens for their valuable comments and criticisms of earlier drafts of
this Article. The views expressed, as well as the remaining errors, remain the author's.
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INTRODUCTION

Suppose that a defendant shoots a gun into a movie theater and
injures one person, the plaintiff. The plaintiff files suit for battery and is
entitled to punitive damages. But what is it that punitive damages can
punish without creating constitutional concerns? Are they limited to
punishing the defendant for injuring the plaintiff? Is it problematic if the
punitive damage award is larger than a prior one awarded against a
defendant for similar conduct? If so, is it still problematic even if the two
plaintiffs suffered different injuries? Can the punitive damage award
punish the defendant for endangering the rest of the audience? If the
plaintiff is (miraculously) not injured by the contact, can punitive
damages still punish the defendant for endangering the rest of the
audience?
The answers to these questions relate to the conception of punitive
damages as part of private law or public law. If punitive damages serve
only a private law function, the award can fulfill only the individual
litigants' interests. But if punitive damages serve a public law function,
they can do much more-they can punish the defendant for the harm his
conduct caused to others and/or to the public and serve as a mechanism
to achieve the public interest. In the middle of the nineteenth century,
legal scholar Simon Greenleaf lamented that punitive damages confuse
public and private law. 1 At the time, the Supreme Court was not
persuaded that this was problematic. 2

1. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 242 n.2 (Boston,
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1848).
2. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (citing the view of Theodore
Sedgwick who, contrary to Greenleaf, argues that punitive damages serve both public and private
law functions).
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But now, the Court's opinions on the constitutional limits on
punitive damage awards dabble between the contrary functions. Much of
the Court's commentary indicates a public law viewpoint of punitive
damages-that they serve the state's interests in punishment and
deterrence, that they are obviously similar to criminal punishments, and
that reform is necessary to make the awards predictable. But the
Court's holdings also focus on the injury to the plaintiff, including by
eliminating the possibility of punishing the defendant for causing harm
to nonparties, which indicates a limited private law function. 4
This dabbling presents multiple questions that the Court will likely
have to address. The first is whether punitive damages can punish the
defendant for the public harm created by the defendant's tortious
conduct, the same harm that criminal law punishes. Lower courts have
already attempted to tackle this question, which arises because of the
Court's constant commentary that punitive damages serve the state's
interests as well as the Court's holding in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams5 prohibiting punishment for harm to nonparties.6 This question
is also relevant to the constitutionality of a punitive damage award
supported only by nominal damages,' an award likely to be minimal
unless punitive damages can punish public harm. The second question is
the priority between the predictability of punitive damage awards and
the personalization of the award to the specific injury to the plaintiff.
This question arises from possible tension between the Court's holdings
in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker8 and PhilipMorris.
This Article attempts to answer these questions by examining the
influence of tort law on the constitutional limitations the Court has
imposed on punitive damage awards. Although sometimes thought of as
having a public law effect, tort law is powerless to address, much less
punish, any wrongdoing unless the defendant's wrongdoing caused the
plaintiff an injury. It is this injury that the Court repeatedly focuses on in
crafting limitations on punitive damage awards, resulting in a
constitutionally-mandated private law conception of punitive damage
awards.
Tort law's injury requirement mandates that punitive damages
cannot constitutionally punish public harm-the damages cannot serve
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part V.
5. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
6. Id. at 353.
7. This was the issue in a petition for certiorari recently denied by the Supreme Court. See
Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 719, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 905 (2011).
8. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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this public law function.9 The only thing that tort law has the capacity to
punish is the defendant's causing an injury to a particular plaintiff.'o
This also means that punitive damages will be minimal if supported by
nominal damages only because the injury in these cases is practically
non-existent. Tort law's injury requirement also mandates that any
concerns for predictability and consistency must give way to the need to
personalize punitive damages to the specific dispute."
Part II of this Article defines the private and public law divide and
applies it to tort law. Part III gives a very brief review of the Court's
punitive damages holdings. Part IV reviews the Court's invocations of a
public law viewpoint of punitive damages, including the purposes of
punitive damages, their similarities with criminal punishments, and the
desire for predictability and consistency among awards. Part V of this
Article further explains the injury requirement of tort law and how it has
affected the Court's limitations on punitive damage awards, resulting in
a private law conception of the award. Part VI discusses likely future
constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards in light of tort
law's injury requirement.
II.

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND TORT LAW

A popular area of debate for torts scholars is whether tort law is
private or public law. Generally, the private-public divide depends on
the interests at stake. If only private interests are involved, the law is
private. If the public or state's interest is involved, the law is public. Tort
law resolves disputes between private parties, but is often seen as a
method of achieving a greater public interest.
A. Defining the Distinction
The overarching dividing point in the civil law tradition, however, is
between public and private law.... This distinction stems from an
ideological assumption of government's role in society. First, private
law represents that area of the law in which government solely
functions to recognize and enforce private rights. In private legal
relations, the government serves as a referee, with the parties as equals
before it. 12

9. See infra Part VI.A.2.
10. See infra Parts V.A. and VL.A.2.
11. See infra Part VI.B.
12. Paul J. Sievers, Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A
Comparative Critiqueof the Puerto Rican and Californian Traditions, 13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 695, 750-51 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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Only the individual litigants' interests are at issue in private law.13 The
government and its interests play a more passive role in private law
because noncompliance with private law does not usually cause harm to
the public as a whole.1 4 Although the government likely desires a
peaceful resolution of the private dispute, the government has little
interest in the actual result.' 5
In public law, however, more is at stake. "The 'driving
consideration' in public law matters . .. is 'the effectuation of the public
interest."' 1 6 Common examples of public law include constitutional,
administrative, and criminal law.17 The government is much more than a
passive participant-it desires that the public interest be served. Usually,
the state is a party to lawsuits involving public law, directly advocating
for the public interest.18 But the lack of direct government involvement
does not render the law at issue private. "Public law regulates private
conduct in order to prevent public or societal harm even when a private
citizen rather than the government seeks the public's protection by
securing private recovery."' 9
The distinction between private and public law depends on what the
government has at stake. If its role is limited to recognizing and
enforcing private interests, the law is likely private. But if it's something
more, like achieving the public interest, the law is likely public. The
distinction may be understandable, but it's not easy to apply to tort
law.20

13. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "PublicLaw Taboo" in InternationalConflict
of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 301 (1999) (explaining that private law is the court's
consideration of 'the rights and duties of private parties to each other[,]'" not that of the public
sphere (quoting Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 289 (1982))).
14. See Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in InternationalContracts and Its
Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 628 (2001).
15. See McConnaughay, supra note 13, at 301 (the nature of private law dictates that the
"'interests of governments are not directly engaged' (quoting Maier, supra note 13, at 289)).
16. Id. (quoting John Henry Merryman, The Public Law-PrivateLaw Distinctionin European
and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3, 12 (1968)).
17. See Sievers, supra note 12, at 750-51.
18. Id at 751.
19. McConnaughay, supra note 14, at 627-28 (footnote omitted).
20. Torts scholars disagree over whether tort law is "merely a branch of the public regulatory
state" or private law. Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratoriesof Democracy, 50
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1501, 1508-09 (2009). The public law camp of scholars includes Judge
Richard Posner, Fleming James, Leon Green, and William Prosser, although these scholars do not
necessarily share the same view of that public law function. Id. The private law camp of scholars
includes George Fletcher, Richard Epstein, Jules Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, John Goldberg, and
Benjamin Zipursky. Id. at 1509.
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The Private and PublicLaw Aspects of Tort Law Liability
Determinations

Traditionally, tort law is thought of as private law.2 1 One of the
original motivations for creating tort law was to prevent duels in the
streets by providing a place for individuals to resolve their differences.
Tort law .'adjust[s] the relations and secur[es] the interests of
individuals and determine[s] the controversies between man and
man."' 22 It is a system that enables a "fair adjustment of the conflicting
claims of the litigating parties."2 3
At the same time, tort law has an "air of public regulation,"24 as its
effect can extend beyond the each tort lawsuit. Although the specific
theories have differed, since the late 1930s, tort law has "been widely
understood by academics to be just another way in which the
government regulates conduct for the public good." 2 5 This view remains
dominant today.26
1. Tort Law's Focus on the Harm to a Private Individual
Traditional tort claims like battery, assault, trespass, and negligence
best reflect the private law function of tort law.27 The government's role
is passive and limited to providing a forum to enable "the recognition
and enforcement of private rights."2 8
21. Id. at 1507; see also Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private,44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
677, 679 (2007) ("In a common law country, private law would translate, more or less, to the law of
tort, contract, property, inheritance, as well as many aspects of family and commercial law.").
22. See McConnaughay, supra note 13, at 301 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Public Law and
PrivateLaw, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469, 470 (1939)).
23. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15 (5th
ed. 1984); see also Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1533,
1540 (2009) ("Tort was indeed private law, and classical legal thinkers found it important to
emphasize that as private law it should not be used as a redistributive mechanism, but rather only as
a mode for vindicating rights."); McConnaughay, supra note 13, at 304 (explaining that private law
"'[exists] mainly to provide private parties with a solution to their disputes in case they have not
done so themselves' (quoting Allan Philip, Mandatory Rules, Public Law (PoliticalRules) and
Choice of Law in the E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in
CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 81, 83 (P.M. North ed., 1982))).

24. Kreitner, supranote 23, at 1540.
25. John Goldberg, The Constitutional Statils of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 583 (2005).
26. See Klass, supra note 20, at 1510.
27. See id at 1507. "Traditional tort claims fall closer to the private law side of the
continuum. . . ." Id. at 1512.
28. See Merryman, supra note 16, at 11; see also Schwarzschild, supra note 21, at 679
("Private law in a civil law country means the law governing individuals and private organizations
and their relations with each other, as opposed to the public law governing the government and its
relations to its citizens.").
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In a typical tort claim, an injured individual plaintiff brings the
claim against the defendant whose (actionable) conduct caused the
(actionable) injury. All tort claims share two main components: (1) some
conduct committed by the defendant that (2) caused the plaintiff an
injury. Tort law addresses various types of conduct, including socially
harmful and/or unreasonable conduct. 29 Generally speaking, intentional
torts define certain socially harmful "wrongs."3 0 Negligence law creates
liability for merely unreasonable conduct.
Even if the defendant commits actionable conduct, tort law still
only provides compensation for certain injuries. In some intentional
torts, legal injury is presumed as soon as the defendant commits the
wrong to the plaintiff. As an example, a plaintiff suffers the legally
cognizable injury necessary to establish battery when the defendant
makes contact with the plaintiff.3 ' In negligence, however, the plaintiff
must establish that she suffered an actual harm; she must have a valid
claim for compensatory damages to recover any damages.32 Only the
person who has been wronged and suffered an injury due to the
defendant's conduct has the power to bring a tort claim.33
The two components of tort law are better understood when
compared to criminal law. Criminal law focuses on public wrongs and
righting the resulting public harm. 34 "The criminal law is concerned with
the protection of interests common to the public at large, as they are
represented by the entity which we call the state; often it accomplishes
its ends by exacting a penalty from the wrongdoer."3 5

29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 1, at 7 ("[T]he law of torts is concerned not solely with
individually questionable conduct but as well with acts which are unreasonable, or socially harmful,
from the point of view of the community as a whole."); see also Kreitner,supra note 23, at 1540
(stating that although both contract and tort law originated as private law, "it was contract [law] that
served as the true core of private law, with tort [law] always retaining an air of public regulation").
30. This first component is often referred to as a "wrong" committed by the defendant, a label
that generally only applies to intentional torts.
31. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, §9, at 39 ("A harmful or offensive contact with a
person ... is a battery."). The contact in question need not cause physical harm. Id § 9, at 41.
32. Id § 30, at 165.
33. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 150
(2005).
34. David G. Owen, Aggravating Punitive Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 181,
185 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/2-2010/Owen.pdf ("Unlike tort . .. and other
branches of private law, which principally seek justice between private parties in private disputes,
criminal law instead focuses on the retributive-justice and deterrence needs of the public.").
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 1, at 5; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(b), at 13 (2d ed. 1986) ("The aim of the criminal law ... is to
protect the public against harm, by punishing harmful results of conduct or at least situations (not
yet resulting in actual harm) which are likely to result in harm if allowed to proceed further.").
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A crime causes a public harm-it harms society as a whole. This is
why a crime can occur without causing anyone injury: "a public wrong
can occur in the absence of an individual victim." 36 For instance,
speeding is a crime because it endangers society and harms the public as
a whole. If the crime caused an injury to a particular person, criminal
law does nothing to help this person as he receives nothing from the
prosecution of the crime. Criminal prosecution and punishment protect
the public. Imprisonment protects by removing the criminal from
society.3 Lesser criminal punishments protect by providing a
disincentive to commit crime and hopefully deterring the punished
criminal and others.
In contrast, tort law focuses on private wrongs done to the plaintiff
and righting the resulting private harm. 4 0 Tort law is "directed toward
the compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which
they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized
42
4
interests." 4 ' Thus, tort law requires an injury to a particular person.
Without an injury, there is no individual in need of compensation and no
need for-tort law. 43 Speeding may be criminal, but it is not a tort. But if
36. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present,
and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 427 (2008) ("If a person drives drunk and is
fortunate enough not to cause an accident, she does not commit a tort.. . .But she still commits a
crime; her conduct . .. threatened harm to society.").
37. Professor Dan Markel points out 'that "[r]estitution is also a familiar part of criminal
sanctions, and not long ago, private parties prosecuted criminal actions and collected criminal
fines." Dan Markel, Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 283, 287-88 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/Markel.pdf.
Even if private parties prosecuted criminal actions, this does not mean that the crime suddenly
addresses the harm to the individual instead of to the public. Private prosecution is still only
possible if the defendant's conduct is criminal and conduct is made criminal to protect the public.
Similarly, restitution to a victim, if even available, generally includes payment only for property or
economic losses. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 35, § 1.3(b), at 13 n.4.
38. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 35, § 1.2(e), at 10.
39. See id § 1.5(a), at 23-24.
40. But see Klass, supra note 20, at 1507-09 (describing modem torts that seem to address
public harm as opposed to harm to an individual person). Perhaps the most common public tort
would be a public nuisance claim brought by the government. See id. at 1508 (exemplifying a public
nuisance suit).
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 1, at 5-6; see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 35,
§ 1.3(b), at 14 (explaining that "torts are wrongs to private individuals but crimes are wrong to the
public"); Colby, supra note 36, at 424 ("The tort is a private wrong to the individual victim; the
crime is a public wrong to society."); Goldberg, supra note 25, at 599 ("[T]ort law .. . empowers a
victim to seek redress from a wrongdoer because that other has acted wrongfully toward
him ... rather than as the vicarious beneficiary of a duty owed to the public at large." (footnotes
omitted)).
42. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 35, § 1.3(b), at 13 ("[T]ort law requires pecuniary
damage, with but minor emphasis on immorality; while criminal law emphasizes immoral behavior,
but often does not require any actual damage.").
43. See Michael I. Krauss, "RetributiveDamages" and the Death ofPrivateOrdering, 158 U.
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someone is injured as a result of the defendant's speeding, that injured
plaintiff has a tort claim for damages to compensate her for that injury.4
The damages will not address or compensate the danger to society that
the defendant caused.
2. Tort Law's Residual Public Law Effect
Despite tort law's origins in private law, with which "'the interests
of governments are not . .. engaged,"' 45 tort law also creates social
norms. 46 Tort law states the community's definition of socially harmful
and/or unreasonable conduct. 47
[A]s applied to driving, negligence law reinforces and elaborates social
norms of safe conduct that drivers must observe for the benefit of other
drivers, cyclists, pedestrians, persons occupying storefronts, and
storeowners. By the same token, malpractice law generates norms of
safe practices that doctors are obligated to heed for the benefit of
patients (and sometimes non-patients), while product liability law
articulates safety norms to be observed by sellers on behalf of product
users and certain others. 48
These norms serve the public interest and the government likely desires
that people obey them.
Today, legislatures even create private tort causes of action to
achieve the public interest. For instance, in response to the recent
mortgage foreclosure crisis, numerous state legislatures passed laws to
try to prevent some of the activities that contributed to the crisis. 49 To
PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 167, 170 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/2-2010/Krauss.
pdf (explaining that "wrongful behavior without damages" does not give rise to tort liability).
44. Even though the conduct is criminal, the likely tort claim is negligence instead of an
intentional tort. The fact that the defendant was speeding, a criminal violation, would create an
inference that the defendant breached the duty he owed to the injured plaintiff. Despite the conduct
being criminal, the injured plaintiff would likely not be eligible for punitive damages because the
defendant's conduct was merely negligent.
45. McConnaughay, supra note 13, at 301 (quoting Maier, supranote 13, at 289).
46. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REv. 363, 376 (1994) ("When persons in the community agree to rules establishing the
boundaries of their legal rights, they each surrender in the process their freedom to violate other
persons' boundaries in pursuit of their own personal objectives."); see also John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEx. L. REv. 917, 918 (2010) ("[Tort law] sets
generally applicable standards of conduct.").
47. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 1, at 7 ("[T]he law of torts is concerned . .. with acts
which are unreasonable, or socially harmful, from the point of view of the community as a whole.").
48. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 608; see also Zipursky, supra note 33, at 149 ("[T]ort
law. .. articulate[s] norms of conduct that enjoin individuals to treat each other in certain ways
(e.g., with reasonable care) and enjoin individuals from treating each other in certain ways (e.g., not
battering others .... ").
49. Klass, supra note 20, at 1521-22.
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help enforce the law, legislatures created tort causes of action for those
injured by violations of the new law.5 0 To incentivize the lawsuit, the
legislatures guaranteed minimum damages, punitive damages, or feeshifting. 5 1 The lawsuit exists only because the legislature believes it will
regulate the industry and thus achieve the public interest. 52
Another situation where it looks like the "interests of society in
general may be involved in disputes in which the parties are private
litigants" 53 is the use of tort law in response to mass catastrophes,
including flooding, terrorism, and environmental disasters. Tort actions
have been filed against airlines based on alleged negligence in allowing
terrorists to board flights, 5 4 and against excessive greenhouse gas
emitters for damages related to the environmental consequences of
climate change. Mass lawsuits for catastrophic injury make it look like
"tort law is part of public law, [and] not merely concerned with settling
disputes between individuals fairly."
C.

The Private and-Actually, Just the PrivateLaw Aspects of Tort
Law's Main Remedy

Regardless of whether tort liability involves the resolution of
private or public interests, tort law has one default remedy:
compensatory damages.57 These damages make the plaintiff whole after
the injury. The plaintiffs injury determines the amount of damages.
Needless to say, compensatory damages do not look to the societal harm
that the defendant caused. To the contrary, compensatory damages look
only to the individual plaintiffs interests.5 9
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1522. These measures increase the chance that the plaintiff will bring suit, similar to
the bounty theory of punitive damages. See infra note 131.
52. Klass, supra note 20, at 1525 ("Although these torts have significant 'private law' aspects
in that they are suits brought by individuals seeking relief for wrongs done to them by private
parties, they also have significant 'public law' aspects.... [T]he states are using tort law to assist
with public regulation.").
53. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 3, at 15.
54. See Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11:
Exploring Liabilityfor ExtraordinaryRisks, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1075, 1107-09 (2009).
55. See id. at 1090-93.
56. Id. at 1129.
57. Legal and equitable relief is available in tort depending on the circumstances. This Article
labels compensatory damages the "default" remedy because of the additional requirements to prove
the other remedies. Equitable relief, such as an injunction, is not available if damages are sufficient.
See I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.5, at 123
(2d ed. 1993). Similarly, restitution is available in tort only if the facts enable a restitutionary
remedy; that is, if the defendant gains from the plaintiff. Id. §4.1(1), at 551.
58. Id.§ 3.1, at 281.
59. See id.
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Personalization of compensatory damages to the plaintiff is proper
in light of tort law's main goal of compensating the injured plaintiff. In
light of this goal, it would be strange to base the plaintiffs damages on
something other than her actual injury. Awarding damages based on the
public harm or an objective valuation of an injury would overcompensate some plaintiffs and under-compensate others. Tort law
resists objective measurements of damages even for intangible losses
like pain and suffering.60 Personalization is also appropriate because it
would not be "fair" to impose any greater monetary burden on the
defendant than the amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole. If tort
law were to allocate the loss differently, we might as well leave the
parties to duel in the street.
Another remedy available in tort law-the remedy at issue in this
Article-is punitive damages. They are available in tort, but not for
every tort. Each state has its own rules regarding the availability of
punitive damages. Per the Second Restatement of Torts, punitive
damages are available if the defendant's tortious conduct is outrageous,
whether because of his "evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others." 62
Punitive damages are not quite as easy to classify as serving a
private or public law function. Like compensatory damages, these
63
damages are traditionally paid to the plaintiff in the specific litigation.

60. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see also Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991) (explaining that the jury has significant but not
unlimited discretion in determining the amount of "compensation for pain and suffering or mental
anguish"). Some courts will not even allow the plaintiff to present expert testimony based on
objective estimates of pain and suffering or the loss of enjoyment of life because there is "no
meaningful relationship between those arbitrarily selected benchmark spending figures and the
value of an individual person's life." Loth, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576-77.
61. Some states do not allow recovery of punitive damages at all. See CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES

§ 78,

at 279 (1935)

(listing Louisiana,

Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington as rejecting the doctrine). Some states have statutorily
defined the availability of punitive damages. These states include, but are not limited to, Alabama,
California, Kentucky, and Nevada. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (2005); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West
1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §411.186 (LEXIS 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (West
2008). Other states use a more general common law standard like the one included in the Second
Restatement. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
63. Many states have adopted statutes mandating that a portion of any punitive damage award
be paid to the state or some specified agency. See DOBBS, supra note 57, § 3.11(12), at 527 & n.39
(listing statutes in Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, and Oregon that mandate that a portion of any
punitive damage award recovered by the plaintiff be given to the state or a specific fund). The
Supreme Court has previously determined that punitive damage awards are not subject to the Eighth
Amendment. The Amendment "places limits on the steps a government may take against an
individual." Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989).
The imposition of punitive damages, however, is not an example of the state's using the "civil

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss3/4

12

Lens: Pushing for the Injury: Tort Law's Influence in Defining the Cons

2011]

PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY

607

But the damages punish and deter.M "They are in part like [criminal]
fines collected by the bounty hunters who prosecute tort cases, and they
are in part like damages awards in a civil action," reflecting both private
and public law functions.65 The larger the amount of the punitive
damage award, the more it seems to diverge from a private law
viewpoint.6 6
III.

BRIEFLY, THE COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE JURISPRUDENCE

In 1885, the Court noted that the "discretion of the jury ... is not
controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such
additional [punitive] damages to be given is attested by the long
continuance of the practice." 6 7 After another century, the Court changed
its tune. In 1986, the Court mentioned the possibility that large punitive
damage awards may be unconstitutional. 68 The Court eventually
determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits "'grossly excessive"' punitive damage awards.

courts to extract large payments or forfeitures." Id. Commentators have noted that the Court's
emphasis that the "proceeds of civil judgments do not revert to the state . . . rais[es] the intriguing
possibility that split-recovery schemes, whereby a portion of the punitive damages award is given
over to the state or a state-operated fund, might require reexamination of the issue." Catherine M.
Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS LJ. 25, 30 (2009) (footnote omitted). Even in split-recovery schemes, however, the -state
has no involvement in the lawsuit; the state "has not taken a positive step to punish, as it most
obviously does in the criminal context." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275. Plus, if the portion of
the award is diverted to a fund akin to the victim's compensation fund found in Missouri, the state is
not merely trying to raise money, another factor relevant in Browning-Ferris. Id; see Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.675 (West 2008).
64. Tort law allows the awarding of punitive damages to fulfill tort law's purposes of
punishment and deterrence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c.
65. Zipursky, supra note 33, at 130. Professor Zipursky labels this duality as subjective
punitiveness and objective punitiveness. Id. at 154-55. Subjective punitiveness is related to the
private law effect of the damages, and objective punitiveness reflects the public law effect. Id. at
154.
66. See Krauss, supra note 43, at 175 ("[M]assive punitive damage awards in products
liability and intentional tort cases have blurred the public/private divide."); Owen, supra note 34, at
193 (explaining that as the size of punitive damage awards increases, the more it looks like a public
law remedy than a private law remedy); see also Colby, supra note 36, at 397 ("[Before 2007,]
punitive damages were, with increasing frequency, awarded to punish the defendant for the total
harm that its wrongful conduct caused to all of society, not just the harm that it caused to the actual
plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court . . . .").
67. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
68. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986).
69. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,454 (1993)).
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A. Early EvaluationsofPunitive Damage Awards
In a 1991 case entitled Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip,70 the Court upheld a punitive damage award that was more than
four times the amount of compensatory damages. 7 1 The Court noted that
"unlimited jury discretion . .. in the fixing of punitive damages may
invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." 72 But
the actual jury instructions at issue ensured that the jury's discretion was
"exercised within reasonable constraints," meaning that no due process
violation occurred.
The specific jury instructions at issue explained the purposes of
punitive damages. That is, punitive damages do not function to
compensate, but to punish the defendant and "protect the public by
[deterring] the defendant and others" from committing similar
wrongdoing in the future.74 They also instructed the jury to consider "the
character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
necessity of preventing similar wrong."7 The Court noted that the
state's appellate review of punitive damage awards also checked the
jury's discretion.76
Two years later, the Court upheld another punitive damage award
in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.77 This time, the
punitive damage award was 526 times larger than the compensatory
damage award. In support of its claim for punitive damages at trial, the
defendant presented evidence that the plaintiff had "engaged in similar
nefarious activities in its business dealings in other parts of the
country." 79 In upholding the punitive damage award, the state supreme
court noted that the type of "'fraudulent action intentionally
undertaken ... in this case could potentially cause millions of dollars in
damages to other victims.",so
The Supreme Court specifically noted that "[i]t is appropriate to
consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's
conduct would have caused its intended victim . .. as well as the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
1992)).

499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
See id. at 19.
Id.
See id. at 20-21.
509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 453 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va.
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possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred."' Compared to the amount of potential
losses that would have resulted if the "illicit scheme" had succeeded, the
82
punitive damage award was not excessive. Thus, the award, like the
award in Haslip, was constitutional.
B. The ConstitutionalGuideposts
In 1996, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,83 the Court was
confronted with a $2 million dollar punitive damage award in a case
where the defendant failed to disclose that the "new" car sold to the
plaintiff had been repainted prior to delivery. 84 The jury awarded the
plaintiff only $4,000 in compensatory damages.
The Court chose this case to create three guideposts to test whether
a punitive damage award is "grossly excessive" and too arbitrary to be
constitutional. An evaluation of the guideposts also indicates whether
the defendant "receive[d] fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose."
The first and "most important" guidepost is whether the damages
are commensurate to the level of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct. The second guidepost is whether a reasonable relationship
exists between the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages.89
The Court declined, however, to define what ratio constitutes a
"reasonable relationship." 90 The last guidepost is a comparison of the
punitive damage award to the civil or criminal penalties imposed for
comparable conduct. 9 ' Along with the guideposts, BMW also clarified
that punitive damages cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed
in another state. 9 2 Applying the guideposts to the facts of the case, the
81. Id. at 460.
82. Id. at 462.
83. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
84. Id. at 563-64.
85. Id. at 565.
86. Id at 574-75.
87. Id. at 574. The Court was "cagey about just which component of the Due Process Clause
formed the basis for its holding." Colby, supra note 36, at 403. Professor Colby goes on to explain
that the Court's focus was substantive due process: "The Court's real problem with the punitive
damages award in BMW was that it was too large, not that it was unexpected." Id at 403-04.
88. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
89. Id at 580.
90. See id at 580-83.
91. Id at 583.
92. Id. at 572 ("We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that
a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
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Court, for the first time, found the punitive damage award
unconstitutionally excessive.93
Later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,9 4 the Supreme Court clarified its second guidepost slightly,
stating that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with
due process." 95 Still though, the Court acknowledged that a different
ratio may be constitutionally permissible depending on the amount of
compensatory damages: "The precise award in any case, of course, must
be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct
and the harm to the plaintiff." 9 6
Also in State Farm, the Court clarified that punitive damages
cannot punish a defendant for "dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised." 9 7 Factually, State Farm was a badfaith failure to settle a claim brought by an insured against an insurer.
The plaintiff, at trial, introduced evidence of State Farm's "national
scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping [insurance policy]
payouts on claims company wide." 98 Other victims of the alleged
scheme were not parties to the litigation, however, and most of the
practices in the alleged scheme "bore no relation to third-party
automobile insurance claims" like the plaintiffs. 99 The Court held that
due process "does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant." 0 0
C. Philip Morris v. Williams
The Supreme Court again clarified the reprehensibility guidepost in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams in 2007.01 Philip Morris involved a

$79.5 million punitive damage award in a lawsuit arising out of the

tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States."). The punitive damage award in TXO likely also
encompassed punishment for out-of-state conduct because evidence of such conduct was introduced
at trial. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1993). BMW likely
overrules TXO in this respect.
93. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86.
94. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
95. Id. at 425.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 422-23.
98. Id at 415 (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah
2001)).
99. Id.
100. Id at 423. The Court also mentioned that punishment for the defendant's conduct to
nonparties "creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct." Id.
101. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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death of a cigarette smoker. 102 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
engaged in deceit in its sale of cigarettes by failing to disclose the
associated health risks.'o 3 Philip Morris's main argument on appeal was
that a portion of the $79.5 million punitive damage award "represented
punishment for its having harmed others" and not just the plaintiff to the
lawsuit.' 0
The Supreme Court held that punitive damages cannot punish the
defendant for causing harm to nonparties, meaning individuals not
parties to the lawsuit who have their own tort claims against the
defendant. 0 5 Punishment for causing harm to nonparties violates the
Due Process Clause in two ways. 106 First, it deprives the defendant an
opportunity to defend itself against claims of injured nonparties. 107 For
instance, the defendant would not be liable if the nonparties knew that
smoking was dangerous and thus could not establish reliance on the
defendant's misrepresentations. os Second, punishment for harm to
nonparties would "add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation" based on the amount of harmed nonparties, the
extent of their injuries, and the circumstances of those injuries that could
be included in the award.109 These questions, none of which could be
fully answered in the plaintiffs individual lawsuit, heighten the
arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice in imposition of punitive
damages. 110

At the same time, the jury may consider the defendant's conduct
towards people other than the plaintiff in determining reprehensibility as
102. Id. at 349-50.
103. Id.
104. Id at351.
at 353. This due process-based holding likely overrules the Court's consideration
105. See id.
of harm to others in evaluating the punitive damage award in TXO. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). Based on the TXO reasoning, the punitive damage award
could include punishment for purely hypothetical losses not even yet actionable in tort. Philip
Morris seems to now preclude this possibility. This TXO reasoning allowing punishment for
hypothetical losses is also invalid under this Article's explanation of the influence tort law's injury
requirement has on the constitutional limitations the Court has placed on punitive damage awards.
See infra Part V.
106. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353-54. Professor Colby argues that the Court's due process
rationale does not justify the Philip Morris decision because evidence of the multiple private harms
is still admissible for purposes of reprehensibility. Colby, supra note 36, at 410-11. But Colby still
argues that the decision is correct because of substantive due process-heightened procedural
protections, the same that apply in criminal proceedings, are necessary "unless the punishment is
meted out solely for the private wrong, not the public one." Id. at 447. Thus, remand was necessary
to ensure that the punishment encompassed only the private wrong.
107. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353-54.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 354.
110. Id
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"harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.""' The end result of
Philip Morris is that the lower courts must provide "some form of
protection" to ensure that the jury considers the evidence of harm to
nonparties in evaluating reprehensibility, but not in determining how
much to punish the defendant.112
D. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
In 2008, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,"3 the Court addressed a
common law-based challenge to a punitive damage award.11 4 Factually,
the defendant was reckless in allowing a known alcoholic to captain a
tanker carrying crude oil. That captain presided over one of the greatest
environmental disasters ever, the spilling of eleven million gallons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound.' " In this specific mandatory class
action, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and $5
billion in punitive damages against the corporate defendant, Exxon
Shipping Co." 6
The Supreme Court started its discussion of the punitive damage
award by noting that the case "goes to our understanding of the place of
punishment in modem civil law and reasonable standards of process in
administering punitive law."" 7 After reviewing the history of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he real problem, it seems,
is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.""' 8 For instance, in two
cases with "strikingly similar facts," one jury awarded $4 million in
punitive damages and the other awarded none. 119
This unpredictability is intolerable. As Justice Souter explained: "a
penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even
Justice Holmes's 'bad man' can look ahead with some ability to know
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another." 20
111. See id at 355.
112. See id at 357. The jury's ability to make this distinction and/or the existence of this
distinction has been the subject of much criticism. See infra Part V.B.2.
113. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
114. See id. at 501-02 (noting that the case involves "the exercise of federal maritime common
law authority").
115. Id.at478.
116. Id. at 480-81. The defendant had already spent $2.1 billion in clean up efforts, paid $25
million in criminal fines and $100 million in restitution, $900 million in claims brought by the
United States and Alaskan government, and $303 million in voluntary settlements with other private
parties. Id at 479.
117. Idat490.
118. Id. at 499.
119. Id.at5OO.
120. Id at 502. Justice Holmes explained that the best way to know and understand the law is
to "look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
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Reasonable predictability is also necessary for the next bad men: "the
penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability
of suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage."l21
To better achieve predictability, the Court suggested that the fact
finder "peg[] punitive [damages] to compensatory damages using a ratio
or maximum multiple." 2 2 The amount of the multiplier should be based
on the level of "blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum" and
the amount of compensatory damages.12 3 If the amount is substantial, a
lesser ratio is appropriate; if the amount is modest and/or the odds of
detecting the harm are minimal, a higher ratio is appropriate.12 4
Applying this to the facts of Exxon, the Court determined that a 1:1 ratio
was appropriate due to mere recklessness of the conduct and the
substantial compensatory award.125
Because Exxon was a common law-based challenge, its expressed
concern for predictability is not binding on the states and could be
abrogated by Congress. However, some lower courts have already begun
to incorporate the concern for predictability within the constitutional
analysis of punitive damages.1 26
IV.

THE COURT'S SEEMING ADOPTION OF THE PUBLIC LAW FUNCTION
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether punitive
damages serve a private or public law function.127 Much of the Court's
enables him to predict." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897). That is, "[i]f you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum." Id. at 462. This
is in contrast to the view of a good man, who would be guided both by the consequences and his
conscience and choose to not commit the tort on these bases. See id. at 459.
121. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 502.
122. Id. at506.
123. See id. at 512-13.
124. Id.at513.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., James Crystal Licenses, LLC v. Infinity Radio Inc., 43 So. 3d 68, 79 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (noting that a punitive damage award fifty-five times larger than the compensatory
damages awards exceeded "reasonable predictability").
127. The purpose of this section is not to argue which of the views of punitive damages is
correct, but to attempt to determine the Court's view regarding whether punitive damages serve a
private or public law function. The justifications for punitive damages are another hot topic in legal
scholarship. The main camps include a victim vindication model, advanced by Mark Geistfeld,
Thomas Colby, Marc Galanter and David Luban, John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin
Zipursky. Generally, the victim vindication model claims that the damages vindicate a victim's
dignity and autonomy-a private law viewpoint of punitive damages. See Dan Markel, How Should
Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1394-95 & n.35 (2009). Other scholars propose
a cost internalization or deterrence justification, including Judge Guido Calabresi, Bruce Chapman
and Michael Trebilcock, Thomas Galligan, Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, and Catherine
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commentary, however, indicates a public law function. This commentary
includes the Court's explanations of the state's interests in punitive
damages, the similarities between punitive damages and criminal
punishments, and the need to increase the predictability of punitive
damage awards.
A. The State's Interest in Punitive Damages
In 1885, the Court stated that punitive damages "blend[] together
the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and give
damages, not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the
offender." 2 8 Today, however, the Court clearly describes that punitive
damages further the state's interest in punishment and deterrence.12 9
Thus, the state is more than a passive participant; it wants the plaintiff to
recover punitive damages because such damages serve the state's
interests. 13 0 Under this conception of punitive damages, the damages do
more than merely resolve the dispute between the private parties' they "vindicate the public interest."l 3 2
The Court's conclusion that punitive damages serve the state's
interests in punishment and deterrence is not mandatory. It is possible
that the damages could punish and deter within a private law function.
For instance, punishment could be limited to vindicating "the dignity of
an individual victim by allowing her to punish the defendant for
Sharkey. Id. at 1387 n.5. Professor Markel proposes a pluralistic approach to punitive damages,
allowing for retributive, aggravated, and deterrence-based damages depending on the factual
circumstances. Id at 1420. Professor Markel first introduced his retributivist public law account of
punitive damages in an earlier article. See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as IntermediateSanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 257-66 (2009).
128. See Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
129. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
130. Klass, supra note 20, at 1563 (concluding that punishment and deterrence are public law
goals given that the Court classifies them as state interests). If the state's interest in litigation is
something more than enforcing private rights, the law at issue is more likely to be public than
private, at least using the traditional distinction between the two. See McConnaughay, supra note
13, at 301-02.
131. If punitive damages serve any public law function, that theory must necessarily
incorporate the bounty theory of punitive damages, requiring that the damages be large enough to
create an incentive to bring suit. See Owen, supra note 46, at 380 ("[T]he very existence of a
prospective windfall . . .helps to motivate reluctant victims to press their claims .... ). If the
potential punitive damages are not large enough, punitive damages would be powerless to achieve
the state's interests because no plaintiff would file suit. Id. at 380-81. The incentive is especially
necessary if the defendant's conduct caused only minimal compensatory damages. See BMW, 517
U.S. at 582 (explaining that a higher ratio of compensatory to punitive damages may be appropriate
when the defendant causes only minimal compensatory damages).
132. Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures,69 VA. L. REV. 269, 292 (1983).
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committing a humiliating or insulting tort upon her."l 3 3 This idea of
vindictive punishment would make punitive damages a form of "legally
sanctioned private revenge."' 34 The same holds true with deterrence. It
could be limited to deterring the particular defendant from committing
the same conduct and injuring the plaintiff again.135
Despite the possibility of limiting punishment and deterrence to a
private law conception of punitive damages, the Court has not done so.
Further evidencing the Court's leaning toward a public law conception
of punitive damages is the Court's rejection of compensation as a
justification for punitive damages.13 6 Compensation is the only
commonly discussed justification for punitive damages that illustrates
solely a private law function in that the damages would be limited to
fulfilling the injured plaintiff s interests.' 37
Although the Court has stated that punitive damages serve the
state's interests, the Court has not expressly addressed whether this
means that punitive damages can punish the defendant for the public
133. Colby, supra note 36, at 434. Technically, nominal damages (and not punitive damages)
provide this recognition. And tort law itself certifies the importance of the plaintiffs legal rights. If
the purpose of punitive damages was to symbolize the importance of the plaintiff's right to bodily
integrity, they would be available in all battery cases, which is not true.
134. Id.
135. This would be a theory of specific deterrence, as opposed to general deterrence. "In
simplest terms, 'specific deterrence' seeks to deter the defendant .. . from repeating a wrongful act
through the imposition of punitive damages." Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the
Supreme Court's Recent Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV.
880, 887 (2008). However, "general or economic deterrence ... will deter others who might
otherwise engage in the same type of conduct at issue in the lawsuit." Id. (footnote omitted).
Even within specific and general deterrence, scholars have also noted different theories
regarding the most effective type of deterrence: optimal versus complete deterrence. See Markel,
supra note 127, at 1391 & n. 18 (explaining that optimal deterrence theory prices the conduct and
requires a defendant to pay for its tortious activity but envisions that the defendant will continue the
activity, while complete deterrence prohibits the conduct and seeks to deter the future commission
of the conduct).
Numerous scholars believe that the Court has either abandoned the deterrence purpose or
that it never existed as an independent purpose in the first place. See Michael P. Allen, OfRemedy,
Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The Significance Of Philip Morris v. Williams,
63 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 343, 365 (2008) (arguing that the Court "discounted the deterrent
function of punitive damages" in Philip Morris); Colby, supra note 36, at 459-60 (arguing that
deterrence is no different from punishment); F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on
Punitive Damages Awards: "Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 383 (2008)
("[T]he Court has allowed its preference for retribution to trump considerations of ... deterrence.");
Sharkey, supra note 63, at 52-53 (arguing that, in Exxon, the Court redefines the only legitimate
state interest in punitive damages as retributive punishment). Deterrence is the main justification for
imposing punitive damages purely because of vicarious liability, which the majority of states allow.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, §2, at 12-13. If deterrence is not a valid justification for imposing
punitive damages, punitive damages should not be available based solely on vicarious liability.
136. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491-92 (2008).
137. See supra Part II.C.
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harm that he caused.138 The current model jury instructions of numerous
jurisdictions allow punishment for the public harm. In Texas, for
example, the standard instructions give the jury permission to evaluate
the "extent to which [the defendant's] conduct offends a public sense of
justice and propriety."l 39 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit's instructions
direct the jury to consider the extent of criminal sanctions, which punish
public harm, for comparable conduct.14 0
According to precedent, the public law view of punitive damages
encompassed in these jury instructions is not improper. Per Philip
Morris, a jury cannot punish the defendant for harm it caused to
nonparties. 14 1 But Texas's and the Eighth Circuit's jury instructions
enable the jury to consider the harm that the defendant's conduct caused
society as a whole as opposed to individual nonparties. 142
B. 'Similaritieswith CriminalPunishments
Criminal law is, of course, public law. The state actively
participates in criminal law proceedings and criminal punishments serve
the public interest by punishing the defendant for the public harm he
created. Any similarities between punitive damages and criminal
punishments "mov[e] punitive damages even further into the public law

realm."1 4 3
The Court is not shy in acknowledging that "punitive damages
advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also
among the interests advanced by the criminal law."1 Not only has the
138. Much of the Supreme Court's commentary on punitive damages has focused on appellate
review as opposed to providing "any specific kind of guidance" on jury instructions. Anthony J.
Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994 (2007).
139. TEX. PATTERN JURY CHARGES: GENERAL NEGLIGENCE & INTENTIONAL PERSONAL
TORTS §8.6A (2008).
140. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 5.02C (2008).
141. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).
142. See, e.g., Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 965 So. 2d 511, 517 (La. Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he trial
court's reference to nonparties [in the jury instructions] within the context of the public's interest
and safety did not violate the defendant's rights to due process."). Professor Colby believes that
Philip Morris "put an end to the uncertainty" of whether punitive damages could punish for public
harm. Colby, supra note 36, at 400. But the basis of the appeal in Philip Morris was not that the
plaintiff referred to the harm that the defendant caused to society as a whole, but to the harm that the
defendant caused to other smokers who had not yet sued. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 350-51.
Technically, Philip Morris only prohibits punishment for multiple private harms to nonparties. See
id. at 353-54; see also Sebok, supra note 138, at 999 ("The problem with the plaintiffs jury
instructions in Philip Morris, according to the Court, was that they allowed the jury to decide
whether the defendant had legally harmed smokers who had not sued and whose cases were not
properly presented to the jury.").
143. See Klass, supra note 20, at 1563.
144. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989); see
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Court stated that the "points of similarity" between punitive damages
and criminal punishments are "obvious[,]"l 4 5 but a number of the
Court's holdings have sought to make punitive damages more like
criminal punishment.
1. The Guideposts: Hoping to Achieve an Objective Scale of
Punitive Damage Awards
Two of the Supreme Court's BMW constitutional guideposts,
reprehensibility and comparable criminal sanctions, seek to make
punitive damages more like criminal punishments. Specifically, these
guideposts seek to create an objective scale of punitive damages based
on the tortious conduct, similar to how criminal punishment is based on
the severity of the crime.
Per the reprehensibility guidepost, a punitive damage award should
reflect the defendant's level of reprehensibility as compared to all other
tortfeasors paying punitive damages. 146 A defendant who caused
economic losses should face a smaller punitive damage award than a
defendant who caused physical injury.14 7 Or, a defendant who acted
maliciously should face a larger damages award than a defendant who
acted recklessly. 14 8
Somewhat similarly, the comparable criminal sanctions guidepost
mandates that courts compare the punitive damage award to the criminal
punishment that the legislature set for comparable conduct-a legislative
determination deserving of "'substantial deference."'l 4 9 The effect of
this comparison is to scale punitive damage awards similar to how
criminal punishments are scaled based on the severity of the crime.

also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (stating that punitive
damage "awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties").
145. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008).
146. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-76 (1996).
147. See id. at 576 (observing that the harm inflicted was "purely economic" and, therefore, did
not warrant "a significant sanction in addition to compensatory damages").
148. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 510-11.
149. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris at 492 U.S. at 301 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 428 (2003) ("Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal
penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been
observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof."). Of course, the legislature represents
the community and is thus speaking for the community in determining the extent of proper
punishments. Similarly, juries speak "as the voice of the community" in assessing the amount of
punitive damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Perhaps juries deserve the same
deference as they, like the legislature, represent the community.
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If fully implemented, 15 0 these two guideposts would create an
objective scale of punitive damages, similar to the criminal sentencing
guidelines that the Court applauded in Exxon.' 5 1 The scale would define
levels of reprehensibility and the corresponding punitive damage award,
possibly using criminal sanctions for comparable conduct as a reference
point. This scale would compare tortious conducts and objectively define
the award. And the scale would likely not take the individual, injured
plaintiff into account. This same irrelevance of the victim occurs in the
criminal system.
The criminal sanction guidepost also seeks to make punitive
damages similar to criminal punishments in another way. If a punitive
damage award should be similar to a criminal sanction for comparable
conduct,1 52 apparently the two punishments punish the same thing.
Criminal punishments punish the public harm. Per this guidepost,
punitive damages do the same.
2. Using the Analogy to Explain the Need to Reform
In Exxon, the Court further expounded on the need to make the
punitive damage system more like the criminal punishment system. 153
The Court criticized punitive damage awards as too unpredictable and
explored possible reforms.15 4 The majority of the Court's analysis
tracked how the federal criminal sentencing system moved from a
discretionary to a guidelines-based system.15 5 "To the Court's mind,
little separates punitive damages from criminal fines and penalties; so
the guidelines solution for restraining discretion in the criminal context
'
would seem to apply full force in the civil context." 56
150. Unfortunately, the reprehensibility guidepost has proven not to be user-friendly. "[T]he
Court failed to provide clear guidance about when 'bad' was 'so bad' that it justified a particularly
high award of punitive damages." Allen, supra note 135, at 349. The same measurement difficulty
exists in criminal law, which is why courts are happy to defer to legislative judgments on the proper
punishments. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26
ALASKA L. REv. 1, 38-39 (2009) (stating that "there is no easy way to convert crimes into terms of
punishment[,]" thus, "when a legislature steps in and attempts to establish a hierarchy of crimes and
to assign sentencing values to those crimes, the Court is loathe to second-guess the result of that
policy-laden work.").
151. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 506 (discussing the guidelines-based federal criminal sentencing
system). But see State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 (explaining that punitive damages must remain distinct
from criminal penalties because the civil process does not provide the same procedural protections).
152. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (explaining that a comparison of the punitive damage award
and the civil or criminal penalties for comparable conduct may indicate excessiveness of the
punitive damage award).
153. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 504-06.
154. See id at 503-04, 506-07.
155. See id. at 505-06.
156. Sharkey, supra note 63, at 44.
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Before the federal criminal sentencing system changed to a
guidelines-based system, sentencing was left to the judge's discretion:
"Judges could impose any length of punishment for virtually any reason,
and appellate review was essentially unavailable."l 5 7 Thus, "'similarly
situated offenders were sentenced [to], and did actually serve, widely
disparate sentences."" 58 In the last quarter of a century, however, the
federal criminal system moved to a "system of detailed guidelines tied to
exactly quantified sentencing results."' 59
According to the Supreme Court, the same problems that existed
with the discretionary criminal sentencing system exist today in the
imposition of punitive damages.160 Two tortfeasors committing the exact
same conduct can easily be subject to vastly different punitive damage
awards. Just as with criminal sentencing, punitive damages must be
reformed "to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the
evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any
principled system of justice."' 6 ' Per the Exxon Court, not only are the
purposes of punitive damages similar to criminal punishments, the
system for imposing punitive damages should also be similar to the
federal sentencing guideline system.16 2

157. Fisher, supra note 150, at 17.
158. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 505 (alteration in original) (quoting Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword:
Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990)). Although not mentioned by the Court, the punitive damage system
is arguably even more discretionary because the decisions of whether to award punitive damages
and how much to award are left to the jury. Additionally, each civil case is heard by a different jury,
precluding juries from having any reference point.
159. Id. The Court in Exxon celebrates the movement from the discretionary criminal
sentencing system to the current guidelines. The justices on the Court, however, had no involvement
with that movement. See id. at 505-06. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, which established these new guidelines. Id. at 505. Ironically, the Court's involvement came
later, when it struck down the mandatory nature of the guidelines, rendering them merely advisory.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
160. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 502-03.
161. See id (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
162. See id at 504-06. States control their systems for determining and imposing criminal
sentences and punitive damages; many do not use guidelines-based systems for criminal sentencing.
See Fisher, supra note 150, at 43 ("[Mlany states in the country still follow a general model of
granting unfettered sentencing discretion within widely prescribed sentencing ranges."). The
Court's concern for predictability and enthusiasm for the federal criminal sentencing guidelines in
Exxon has led some to believe that the guidelines may be constitutionally mandatory. See id. at 46
("If the mission of the Due Process Clause is now seriously to regularize punishment, there is no
reason why that mission should be limited to civil cases."). Exxon, however, was based on federal
common law and is thus not binding on the states in either their punitive damage or criminal
sentencing systems. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 501-02.
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3. Expressions of Moral Condemnation
Another similarity between punitive damages and criminal
sanctions, at least according to the Court's previous holdings, is that the
damages express the community's "moral condemnation" of the
defendant's conduct. 16' The same is true with criminal punishments.'6
The Court may be backing off from this similarity, however. In its
description of punitive damages in Exxon, the Court invoked Justice
Holmes's bad man theory, which separates morality from the law.166
Justice Holmes's bad man understands the law as defined by its
consequences and sees damages as just one of those consequences.
The bad man's view of "damages as nothing more than a
tax .. . remove[s] any moral onus from the conduct ... income tax
doesn't mean that earning an income is reprehensible, and thus the 'tort
tax' doesn't mean that tortious conduct is reprehensible."' 6 8
Justice Holmes did not apply his theory to criminal law and
punishment,169 but the Supreme Court invoked it in the context of
punitive damages.170 The Court's own language also divorces morality
from punitive damages-the Court wants to ensure that a defendant
knows how much the damages will be so that he can choose whether to
still commit the (reprehensible) conduct.' 7 ' Punitive damages seem to
exemplify the inability to separate morality from the law because the

163. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001);
see also Owen, supra note 46, at 374 ("[P]unitive damages proclaim the importance that the law
attaches to the plaintiffs particular invaded right, and the corresponding condemnation that society
attaches to its flagrant invasion by the kind of conduct engaged in by the defendant."). But see
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 35, § 1.3(a), at 12 ("[T]he only real basis for distinction between
crimes and civil wrongs lies in the moral condemnation which the community visits upon the
criminal but not (at least not so powerfully) upon his civil wrongdoer counterpart.").
164. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 35, § 1.2(f), at II ("There is no doubt that society's
ideas about morality ... have had much to do with formulating the substantive criminal law.");
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958), in
CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY 61, 64-65 (Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971)
("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction ... is the judgment of community
condemnation... .").
165. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 502.
166. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The
Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1565 (1997) ("[T]he bad man's point of view removes a
confusion between law and morality.. .
167. See id. at 1565.
168. Id
169. Id. at 1567. Justice Holmes may not have applied his theory to criminal law because
"common sense ... does not consider a jail sentence as merely a tax." Id at 1566. The real reason,
however, may have been that Justice Holmes thought that criminality was innate and that a criminal
would thus not evaluate the consequences of his conduct beforehand. Id at 1567.
170. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 502.
171. See id

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss3/4

26

Lens: Pushing for the Injury: Tort Law's Influence in Defining the Cons

2011]

PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY

62 1

damages are only available if the conduct was reprehensible or, in other
words, immoral.17 2 But the Court's view of punitive damages' role of
expressing moral condemnation may be diminishing.
C. ConcernsAbout Predictabilityand Consistency
The Court's concerns about the unpredictability and inconsistency
of punitive damage awards are most evident in Exxon, in which the
Court declared that unpredictability is the "real problem" with punitive
damages. 173 These concerns are also evident in the reprehensibility and
comparable criminal sanctions guideposts, which also seek to create a
predictable, objective scale of punitive damages.1 74 The fact that the
Court is at all concerned with predictability in punitive damages
indicates a public law viewpoint of punitive damages-these concerns
are more common to public law than to private law.
The reason that predictability and consistency are greater concerns
in public law may be because of the inequality of power. Generally
speaking, public law pits the public or state's interest against an
individual's interest. 175 As an example, criminal law pits the state's
interest in protecting the public against the individual's freedom.
Because of the inequality, it is very important that public law ensure a
fair process and achieve a fair result. Criminal law tries to do so through
procedural protections for the defendant and measures such as the
federal sentencing guidelines.176
Another possible reason why predictability and consistency are
greater concerns in public law is the extent of the consequences for
violating the law. The consequences of violating public law may be
severe: "[C]riminal sentences involve removing people from their
families and putting them behind bars for years on end or even killing
them." 77
172. See Luban, supra note 166, at 1569 ("The existence of punitive damages clearly
indicates ... that the legal system is willing to punish bad men who treat compensation as merely a
cost of doing business.").
173. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 499.
174. See infra Part IV.B.l.
175. See Roscoe Pound, Law and the State-Jurisprudenceand Politics, 57 HARV. L. REV.
1193, 1233 (1944) ("[P]ublic law subordinates individual to public interests. . . .").
176. In the criminal context, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
additional protections for the criminal defendant. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986); see also Fisher, supra note 150, at 17-19 (arguing that regularizing punishment to achieve
predictability and consistency is constitutionally required by the Due Process Clause); Markel,
supra note 127, at 274 n.123 (suggesting the inclusion of additional procedural due process
protections for punitive damages that punish the public wrong).
177. Fisher, supra note 150, at 40. But see LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 35, § 1.3(a), at 12
("Paying damages (especially 'punitive damages') for torts or contract breaches is not much
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Private law has some concern for consistency and predictability, of
course, as consistency and predictability are valid goals for all types of
law." 8 But the inequality of power and extent of consequences are not
the same in private law. Private law resolves the interests of the actual
parties to the dispute. No individual interest is greater than the other.
Certainly, no disparity of power exists to the same extent as between the
government and a mere individual. Further, the consequence of violating
private law is limited to the payment of damages, something not quite as
severe as possible loss of liberty.
Plus, some unpredictability and inconsistency is inevitable in
private law. This is because each dispute will involve different parties
and different individual interests. 179 Specific to punitive damages, the
awards have always been a bit unpredictable because a different jury
awards them each time without specified guidelines.180
The lack of specified guidelines to provide some consistency differs
from criminal law where, even though each prosecution likely involves
different victims and defendants, there is much emphasis that similarly
situated defendants face and receive similar punishments. The Court's
sudden concern with unpredictability and inconsistency in Exxon
indicates that the Court thinks that punitive damages are more like a
public law remedy than a civil damage.
V.

TORT LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS

The Supreme Court has never used tort law to limit punitive
damage awards. 18' Obviously, tort law is not constitutional law. At the
same time, tort law has influenced the Court's definition of the
constitutional limits on punitive damage awards-specifically tort law's
injury requirement. The Court's holdings "have focused, almost laser-

different from paying fines for criminal violations.").
178. Schwarzschild, supra note 21, at 679-80 ("[P]rivate law has mostly been a matter of
common law .... [C]ommon law puts a premium on stability and predictability.
179. See infra Part V.B.3.a. But see Schwarzschild, supra note 21, at 680 ("Nor does the
outcome of a common law tort case typically depend on who is the tortfeasor or what kind of person
is the victim."). This may be true with respect to the outcome of the liability determination, but it is
certainly not true with respect to the outcome of the remedy determination. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
180. See Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages After Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker: The
Questfor Predictabilityand the Role ofJuries, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 182, 197 (2009) (arguing that
it will be difficult to achieve predictability of punitive damages as long as the jury continues to
determine the amount of damages); see also Fisher, supra note 150, at 21-23 (discussing the
unpredictability of punitive damage awards made by juries).
181. Even if it wanted to, the Supreme Court would have no authority to create limitations on
punitive damages based on tort law because tort law is state law.
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like, not on harms to society as a whole when setting the amount of the
[punitive] award, but on only the parties to the lawsuit."l 82 This focus
was apparent even in Exxon.183
Tort law's injury requirement resolves the dispute regarding the
public or private law function of punitive damages. Tort liability exists
only if the defendant caused the plaintiff an injury, and tort law is
capable of punishment only because of the liability for causing that same
injury. Any punitive damage award is thus inherently limited to
punishing the defendant for causing the injury to the plaintiff, resulting
in a private law conception of punitive damages.
A. Tort Law's Injury Requirementand the Resulting Limited Public
Law Effect
Injury is a necessary component of a tort claim.184 Without an
injury, there is no tort claim. True, tort law sometimes presumes an
injury,185 but this presumption merely aids the plaintiff in demonstrating
that an injury occurred. Regardless of how the plaintiff does it, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant caused her an injury to establish
tort liability. The injury was the point of creating tort law: to provide a
means of resolving disputes and compensating a plaintiff who is injured
due to the defendant's conduct.
The injury that gives rise to tort liability is to an individual plaintiff
or plaintiffs, as opposed to the public as a whole.186 "[T]he only private
citizen who can pursue compensation for the violation of a private right
is the victim of the violation of the private right."' The public cannot

182. Scheuerman, supra note 135, at 905.
183. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2008) (suggesting that punitive
damages be pegged to the compensatory damage award).
184. See supraPart II.B.l.
185. See supraPart II.B.l.
186. See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 600 ("Part of what separates wrongs in their public aspect
from wrongs in their private aspect is that something different has happened to a particular person
so as to render his relationship to the wrongful conduct distinct from the general population's.");
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1123, 1134 (2007) ("The reckless driver who hits the pedestrian has not only committed an
antisocial act of a sort that entitles observers to condemn his actions ... he has also wrongfully
injured the victim. The victim is specially situated with regard to the driver's actions. . . ."). This
same distinction between individual versus societal harm is also a current hot topic in class action
litigation. Specifically, the issue is whether the individual class members must each demonstrate
their individual entitlement to damages. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct 1, 3 (2010)
(granting tobacco companies' application for stay of judgment until the Court acts upon the petition
for writ of certiorari).
187. Sebok, supra note 138, at 1007.
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bring a claim for battery against a defendant, even if the defendant's
conduct endangered and harmed the public as a whole.18 8
The injury requirement even exists in tort claims created to
hopefully achieve some greater public interest-person must be injured
to bring that tort claim. Take the example of the tort claim created by a
legislature within laws to try to prevent some of the activities that
contributed to the recent mortgage foreclosure crisis.' 8 9 The aim of the
law overall is to protect the public. The individual tort claim, however,
exists only if an individual is injured by one of the activities prohibited
in the law.
Tort law is thought to establish norms of conduct that regulate
public conduct, but tort law's injury requirement limits the potential
public law effect of tort law. For instance, traditional thought is that
negligence law establishes a norm that we should act reasonably. But
negligence law's only enforcement mechanism is a tort claim, which
exists only if an individual has suffered an injury.' 90 Thus, negligence
law does not create a general "act reasonably" norm. At most, it creates
a norm that we should not commit unreasonable conduct that causes
injury.' 9 ' If there is little chance of injury, negligence law creates no
norms.
Tort law's limited ability to establish norms and achieve a public
law effect also applies to the attempt to regulate conduct through
intentional torts. For instance, a battery claim is thought to create a
societal norm like "do not hit others." But the only enforcement
mechanism is a tort claim, which an individual plaintiff may choose not
to bring.192 The decision not to pursue the claim is highly likely if the
plaintiff lacks compensatory damages. The plaintiff can still win because
injury is presumed,19 3 but a claim for nominal damages only is
economically inefficient.
Further limiting tort law's ability to regulate public conduct is that
no actionable tort exists based on attempted conduct. For instance, tort
liability for battery does not exist unless contact is made. No battery
claim arises from an attempted batteryl 94 -because there is no injury
188. See id
189. See Klass, supra note 20, at 1521-22.
190. The injury requirement even hampers the torts that are supposed to achieve the public
interest, like torts created within an industry regulation. Again, no enforcement mechanism exists
unless an individual is injured as a result of the conduct prohibited in the industry regulation.
191. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 186, at 1154 ("[N]egligence law enjoins drivers to
drive with ordinary prudence so as to avoid causing bodily injury ... to others .....
192. See Zipursky, supra note 33, at 150.
193. See supra Part IBI.
194. The attempted battery may constitute an assault, but that is not guaranteed.
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from the battery. Without liability for attempted conduct, tort liability's
ability to define norms and achieve a public law effect is weakened. Tort
law has a limited ability, if any, to achieve a public law effect because of
its injury requirement. Any constraints on tort law similarly affect
punitive damages, a tort remedy.
B. Seeing Tort Law's Injury Requirement within the Constitutional
Limitations on PunitiveDamage Awards
Tort law's injury requirement has influenced the Court's
constitutional holdings and the limitations it has placed on punitive
damage awards. All of the tangible holdings in BMW, State Farm, Philip
Morris, and Exxon focus the punitive damages on the plaintiffs
injury.19 5 The plaintiffs injury has gradually become more important
within the Court's analysis.
1. Initial Focus on the Injury and Limiting the Public Law Effect
of Punitive Damages
Tort law's injury requirement is apparent in the Court's reasonable
relationship guidepost, introduced in BMW.1 9 6 First, the guidepost
requires a connection between the amount of punitive damages and the
amount of the plaintiffs compensatory damages.19 7 It thus constrains the
amount of the punitive damage award to the plaintiffs injury in each
case. The injury is what enables tort law to punish and thus the
punishment should relate to the injury and nothing else.
Additionally, the guidepost reflects the emphasis on the injury by
denying that any set ratio should exist.' 98 No two injuries are the same.
Different injuries and factual circumstances mean that the amounts of
punitive damages awarded should also differ. The Court consistently
maintains that the proper ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages depends on the facts of each case. In State Farm, the Court
held that only a lower ratio would be reasonable because the large
compensatory damage award already included amounts to punish and
deter.199 If the compensatory damage award does not encompass
195. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 475-76, 515 (2008); Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349-50, 357-58 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 412,429 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 586 (1996).
196. SeeBMW, 517 U.S. at 580-83.
197. Id. at 580.
198. Id. at 582-83.
199. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426. Compensatory damages in tort law can have a deterrent
purpose just like punitive damages. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307
(1986).
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punishment and deterrence (as, traditionally, it should not), the
defendant committing similar conduct should face a different ratio.
Last, this guidepost reflects tort law's injury requirement by
prohibiting any consideration of the public harm that the defendant's
conduct may have threatened or caused in determining the punitive
damage award. 2 00 Harm to the public does not give rise to a tort action
and thus punitive damages, a tort remedy, cannot punish it.
The Court's additional holdings in BMW and State Farm also focus
on the plaintiffs injury by limiting the type of conduct for which the
defendant can be punished in tort. In BMW, the Court declared that
punitive damages cannot punish the defendant for out-of-state conduct,
which obviously did not injure the plaintiff.20 1 In State Farm, the Court
declared that punitive damages cannot punish the defendant for unsavory
business practices that differ from the conduct that injured the
plaintiff.20 2
These decisions do not focus solely on the plaintiffs injury. But
they do preclude a more excessive punishment, which may have better
served the public interest. Without the state-based limitation established
in BMW, 2 03 the jury verdict would have protected all consumers of new
BMWs by punishing BMW for concealing repairs to cars sold as new
throughout the country. Without the similarity of conduct limitation
established in State Farm,2 04 the jury verdict would have protected all
financially weak insureds by punishing the defendant for all of its
practices that took advantage of these insureds. By narrowing what
could be punished, the Court limited the public law effects of these
punitive damage awards.

200. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583, 607 (2003) ("[If punitive
damages were punishment for the full scope of the wrong to society ... it would make no sense to
require a reasonable relationship between the amount of punitive damages and the amount of the
individual plaintiffs compensatory damages."); Sebok supra note 138, at 1002 ("[If punitive
damages truly were intended to punish public wrongs, then it would be hard to explain ... why a
punitive-damages award is measured against the injury suffered by the plaintiff rather than
society .... ); see also Zipursky, supra note 33, at 162, 168 (arguing that the public law or
"objective aspect of punitive damages is virtually the only aspect that shows" in the $2 million
punitive damages awarded in BMW because the plaintiff "did not really have a particularly serious
grievance" against the defendant).
201. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572. Part of the Court's analysis for this conclusion was that the
plaintiff did not produce evidence that "any of BMW's out-of-state conduct was unlawful." Id at
573. The relevance of the legality of the conduct in other states is unclear because conduct does not
need to be illegal to trigger the availability of punitive damages.
202. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23.
203. BMW, 517 U.S. at 572.
204. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss3/4

32

Lens: Pushing for the Injury: Tort Law's Influence in Defining the Cons

2011]

PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY

627

2. Philip Morris: Adopting a Private Law View of Punitive
Damages
Tort law's injury requirement is also evident in the Court's decision
in Philip Morris. The Court held that punitive damages cannot punish
the defendant for harm to nonparties, meaning those who may have their
own tort claims against the defendant. Punitive damages can punish the
defendant only for his conduct that injured the actual plaintiff who
brought the lawsuit. 2 0 5
Tort law requires this result. The defendant would not be liable in
tort to the nonparty if the nonparty "knew that smoking was dangerous
or did not rely upon the defendant's statements" in deciding that
smoking was safe.206 If the nonparty could not establish liability in her
own tort lawsuit against the defendant, then the defendant cannot be
punished for its conduct to that nonparty in any tort lawsuit, much less
one brought by someone other than the nonparty. This is true regardless
of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
Tort law also explains the quirk in the Philip Morris opinion that
evidence of harm to others is still admissible for purposes of evaluating
reprehensibility,207 but that the jury cannot punish the defendant for that
harm. This is a difficult distinction, especially for a jury.208
But it is a necessary distinction because of the constraints of tort
law. Although harm to nonparties may be relevant to whether the
defendant deserves punishment, it cannot be the basis of punishment.
Tort law cannot punish for harm to nonparties because the defendant has

205. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007). The result in Philip Morris
is similar to Professor Zipursky's requirement of subjective punitiveness for punitive damages to be
awarded without criminal procedural protections. See Zipursky, supra note 33, at 154, 156.
However, his proposed analysis consists of an evaluation of the justification for the award after it
has been awarded. See id. at 168-70. Philip Morris mandates procedural protections before the
award is awarded to ensure only a private law view of punitive damages, or what Zipursky calls
subjective punishment. See PhilipMorris, 549 U.S. at 353; Zipursky, supra note 33, at 153-54.
206. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353-54.
207. See id at 355 ("[Hjarm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.").
208. See Allen, supra note 135, at 359 ("1 confess, however, to being truly perplexed as to how
the Court envisions the jury complying with this requirement."); Krauss, supra note 43, at 169
("How jurors are to clear their minds between these two steps is unclear .... ). Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, asserted that he does not believe that a distinction between reprehensibility versus
punishing the harm to nonparties exists: "When a jury increases a punitive damages award because
injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the jury is by
definition punishing the defendant . .. for third-party harm." Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 360
(Stevens, J., dissenting). But tort law lacks the capacity to punish the defendant for the harm to
nonparty victims without a finding of liability for that harm. Thus, if Justice Stevens is correct,
evidence of harm to nonparties should be inadmissible because there's no valid purpose of the
evidence.
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not been found liable in tort for causing that harm. 209 Without liability
for that injury, tort law-based punishment is not possible. 2 10
The result of Philip Morris is that trial courts must provide some
protection to ensure that the jury understands the reprehensibility versus
punishment distinction.21 1 If procedural safeguards cannot ensure that
the jury does not punish the defendant for causing harm to nonparties, 2 12
punishment not possible under tort law, then the evidence of harm the
nonparties should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
equivalent state rules.2 13 These rules exclude evidence if its minimal
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect or
possibility of causing jury confusion. 214
The reason for exclusion would be similar to the exclusion of prior
injuries allegedly caused by a defective product in product liability
claims. Evidence of prior injuries is relevant to whether a defect
exists, 21 5 but courts admit it only if the prior injury "occurred under
circumstances substantially similar to those at issue in the case at
209. See Krauss, supra note 43, at 170 ("It is the conjunction of wrongfulness and the harm
caused thereby that creates the tort obligation.").
210. For the same reason, the Court's reasoning in TXO that the plaintiffs potential losses are
relevant to the punitive damage award is likely no longer good law. See TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). Despite the danger attempted conduct presents to
society, it is not actionable in tort. See supra Part V.A. For instance, liability does not exist for an
attempted battery because without the harmful or offensive contact, no injury has occurred and tort
liability is not possible. Without liability, tort law lacks the capability to punish. Thus, punitive
damages cannot constitutionally punish the defendant for the plaintiffs hypothetical losses had the
defendant's conduct been (more) successful.
211. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355.
212. See, e.g., Hayes v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 07-CV-0682-CVE-TLW, 2009 WL
4912176, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2009) (finding that the risks discussed in Philip Morris"will be
alleviated by the separation of the actual and punitive damages phases of trial"). The only way that
separating the phases of trial would minimize the risk is if the jury forgets about the evidence before
the second phase. Plus, the evidence of harm to nonparties should be relevant only to the punitive
damages phase, which the district court seemed to realize by noting that the evidence would be
admissible in the first phase only if it has "some bearing on the . .. claim for actual damages." Id
213. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
214. Id. ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.");
see also Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-Worthiness of the Court's Unmaking ofPunitive Damages,
2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 459, 467 (2008) (explaining that the Philip Morris decision "will make it
more difficult for plaintiffs' counsel to introduce pattern and practice evidence against corporate
defendants"); Jeremy T. Adler, Comment, Losing the ProceduralBattle but Winning the Substantive
War: How Philip Morris v. Williams Reshaped Reprehensibility Analysis in Favor of Mass-Tort
Plaintiffs, II U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 738-39 n.50 (2009) (arguing that evidence of "the total
amount of harm" should have been excluded under the state versions of Federal Rule of Evidence
403 in both State Farmand Philip Morris).
215. But see Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1983) (excluding
evidence of other injuries allegedly due to same product because of its irrelevance).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss3/4

34

Lens: Pushing for the Injury: Tort Law's Influence in Defining the Cons

2011]

PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY

629

bar." 2 16 Without the substantial similarities, the evidence has only
minimal probative value in showing a defect, which is substantially
outweighed by the evidence's prejudicial effect and tendency to confuse.
The prejudicial effect is the risk that the jury would consider it as
evidence of defect or negligence even with a limiting instruction.2 17
Similarly, the evidence may confuse the jury and cause it to "lose sight
of the actual injury being litigated."2 18
The same idea holds true with regard to evidence of the defendant's
causing harm to nonparties. The evidence is relevant to reprehensibility.
But the evidence should be admissible only if the harm occurred under
substantially similar circumstances. 2 19 This requirement of similarity is
not new to punitive damages. In State Farm, the Court limited evidence
relevant to reprehensibility based on the dissimilarity between it and the
conduct that injured the plaintiff.220
Even if the harm to the nonparties was due to conduct similar to the
conduct that injured the plaintiff, evidence of that harm to nonparties has
minimal probative value in demonstrating reprehensibility if the harm
occurred under any materially different circumstances.221 These
material, different circumstances should include anything that negates
the defendant's liability to the nonparty. Using the facts of Philip
Morris, this would include the nonparty's actual knowledge of the risks
associated with smoking.222 If the nonparty knew of the risks, the
nonparty's harm did not occur under circumstances substantially similar
to the plaintiffs and evidence of the nonparty's harm has limited
probative value in demonstrating reprehensibility.
A material, difference circumstance, like the nonparty's knowledge
of the risks of smoking, also increases the prejudicial effect of the

216. Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1995).
217. See Wolf ex rel Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D.N.J. 1982)
("[T]he tendency would be for the jury to consider the evidence as proof of product defect,
negligence, or causation and not as proof of notice." (footnote omitted)); see also Soldo v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 550 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ("Plaintiffs expert witnesses may not rely
on evidence of other injuries . . . .").
218. Wolfex rel. Wolf 555 F. Supp. at 622.
219. See Allen, supranote 135, at 359.
220. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412, 422-23 (2003); see
also Allen, supra note 135, at 353 (explaining that State Farm "effectively imposed evidentiary
limitations on the raw material juries could use" in determining the amount of punitive damages).
221. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (concluding that punitive
damages cannot punish the defendant for harm to nonparties because doing so would "add a near
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation," including the unanswered question of
whether punishment would be appropriate even though the harm to nonparties occurred under
different circumstances).
222. See id. at 353-54.
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evidence, making exclusion proper under Rule 403.223 There is the
danger that the jury will confuse the issues of reprehensibility and
punishing for that other harm, even with a limiting instruction. That
danger also creates the possible prejudicial effect that the jury will use
the evidence as a basis to punish the defendant.22 4
Philip Morris correctly reflects tort law's mandatory distinction
between reprehensibility and punishing for harm to nonpartiespunishment is not possible without a finding of liability for causing the
harm to nonparties. But evidentiary rules like Federal Rule 403 may
independently mandate the exclusion of evidence of harm to nonparties
even for reprehensibility purposes. 225
3. Resolving Tort Law and Exxon
It is not as easy to see the influence of tort law's injury requirement
in Exxon. Exxon highlights principles-predictability and consistencythat deemphasize the particular facts of each tort lawsuit, facts like the
plaintiff's injury. Still, the Court's ultimate suggestion for reform returns
to tort law's injury requirement.
a. Conflicts Between the Rhetoric of Exxon and Tort Law
The Court spends the majority of the Exxon opinion lamenting that
the current punitive damage system does not achieve predictability
and/or consistency. 226 Plainly, similarly situated defendants do not face
223. If the defendant moved to exclude evidence of its harm to others under Rule 403, the
defendant would have the burden to establish the limited probative value due to dissimilar
circumstances and the prejudicial effect. See FED. R. EVID. 403. This appears to be an impossible
burden. Using the facts of Philip Morris, it would have been impossible for the defendant to show
that the circumstances surrounding the harm to the nonparties differed from the harm to the specific
plaintiff. The specific plaintiffs lawsuit "will not ... answer ... questions as to nonparty
victims[;]" including questions such as: "Under what circumstances did injury occur?" Philip
Morris, 549 U.S. at 354. Perhaps the products liability context shows a better option. Although the
reason for exclusion of dissimilar prior injuries is also based in Rule 403 (and sometimes Rule 401),
the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate the similarities between the injury at issue and the prior
injuries she wishes to introduce to establish defect or notice. See Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718
F.2d 88, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris
v. Williams, 27 REv. LITIG. 9, 25 (2007) (proposing a system where the plaintiff would have the
initial burden to establish that an aggregate punitive damage award is appropriate, but then the
defendant should have the burden to discount the plaintiff's case as "[i]t is often the defendant that
knows how many victims of its conduct exist and whether it has been fined by other courts for the
same conduct").
224. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
225. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355 (explaining that juries may use
reprehensibility evidence to punish the defendant for the harm absent sufficient procedural
safeguards).
226. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499-515 (2008).
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similar punitive damage awards. But this is normal for tort damages.
Traditional thought is that both compensatory and punitive damage
awards should be inconsistent among cases. With respect to
compensatory damages, tort law requires personalization to the
plaintiffs injury. Because no two injuries are the same, 2 27 tort law
effectually mandates inconsistency and unpredictability among
compensatory damage awards. 22 8
Without inconsistency, plaintiffs would not be fully compensated.
Suppose that one plaintiff is an average fourteen-year-old high school
student and the other is training for the Olympics. Both are paralyzed
due to tortious conduct. In the criminal system, punishments for causing
the paralysis would be the same. But in the tort system, the Olympic
hopeful will receive more in damages because of the plaintiffs
individual characteristics. To fully compensate, the damages must focus
on the specific plaintiff without regard to any other plaintiff.2 29
Necessarily, tort law has little concern for whether similarly
situated defendants pay similar amounts of compensatory damages. 23 0
Defendants cause different injuries to different plaintiffs, so consistency
in compensatory awards would actually be inappropriate. Even if the
defendants caused injury to the same plaintiff, the defendants will likely
face different amounts of compensatory damages. The second defendant
will pay damages caused by the aggravation of a pre-existing condition,
even if the condition resulted from the first defendant's conduct. In tort,
concerns about treating defendants fairly give way to the need to
compensate the plaintiff fully. 231
The necessary inconsistency also occurs with non-economic
compensatory damages, although there is increased debate about the
227. See id. at 506 (explaining that no standard tort injury exists).
228. Probably the only damages that are consistent across tort cases are nominal damages.
These damages are not personalized to any party and merely signify that the defendant violated the
plaintiff's legal rights regardless of the egregiousness of the violation.
229. See DOBBS, supranote 57, § 3.1, at 281.
230. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 186, at 1140 (explaining that compensatory damage
awards "often entail[] a disjunction between the sanction that a tortfeasor 'deserves' for his
misconduct ... and how much he must actually pay").
231. An example of this is market share liability, which enables a plaintiff to recover
compensatory damages in products liability cases based on a defective product despite her inability
to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct actually caused her injury. Instead, the burden to negate
causation shifts to the defendants. In New York, the defendant will still pay damages based on its
share of the market even if it can demonstrate that it did not manufacture the product that caused the
plaintiff's damages. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). This
system sacrifices fairness to the defendant in order to better ensure compensation to the injured
plaintiff. Id. at 1075, 1078 ("[T]he loss [should] be borne by those that produced the drug for use
during pregnancy, rather than those who were injured by the use, even where the precise
manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified .... .").
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fairness of these damages.2 32 Juries must award an amount of damages
specific to the plaintiffs injury, including the plaintiffs specific pain
and suffering. In Haslip, the Court noted that no due process violation
occurs as long as jury instructions reasonably constrain the jury's
significant discretion in awarding noneconomic compensatory
damages.233 The Court said the same thing about punitive damages in
Haslip.234 Exxon, however, states that punitive damages are too
unpredictable and that jury instructions cannot fix the problem; 235 maybe
non-economic compensatory damages are too unpredictable as well. 2 36
But if the jury's role in awarding noneconomic compensatory damages
is replaced with some objective measure, some plaintiffs will not receive
full compensation for their injuries.
As with compensatory damages, the traditional thought is that
punitive damage awards should differ among defendants and cases, and
hence be inconsistent.2 37 Specifically, the amounts of punitive damages
should vary depending on the defendant's particular circumstances to
ensure that the defendant "feels" the award. A $1 million punitive
damage award may be too much punishment for someone with a small
net worth, but not enough for someone with a large net worth. Similarly,
a certain amount deters one defendant too much, but may not deter a
wealthier defendant enough.
Long before Exxon, the Court rejected any notion of consistency
among punitive damage awards: "[A] jury imposing a punitive damages
award must make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and
232. Several states have begun to outlaw non-economic damages in certain contexts. See, e.g.,
Rustad, supra note 214, at 515-16 ("In 2005 alone, roughly half of the states capped non-economic
damages in medical liability cases. . . .").
233. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991) ("As long as the discretion is
exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied.").
234. Id.
235. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008) (doubting that jury
instructions are the answer to the unpredictability problem).
236. Haslip saw no difference between the jury's discretion in assessing non-economic
compensatory damages and punitive damages. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20. Thus, Exxon should also
apply to non-economic compensatory damages. See Sharkey, supra note 63, at 45 ("Surely, the
same unpredictability that taints the jury's punitive damages decision-making process would surface
in the jury's determination of noneconomic compensatory damages .... ). Perhaps the Court would
distinguish the two by finding that jury instructions do fix any unpredictability issue with noneconomic damages, although there is little guidance in jury instructions for non-economic
compensatory damages. Or maybe the correct distinction is that the unpredictability is more
tolerable for non-economic compensatory damages because the damages compensate, whereas
punitive damages punish. If this is the distinction, it conflicts with Haslip, which saw no distinction
between the jury's discretion in assessing both non-economic compensatory damages and punitive
damages.
237. See Owen, supra note 46, at 365 (explaining the different factors the jury takes into
consideration when formulating a punitive damage award).
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circumstances unique to the particular case before it. Because no two
cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such awards are
difficult to make."238 Under this line of thinking, consistency among
punitive damages should not exist.
But then Exxon happened. The Court avoided the problem of
making factual comparisons by simply not making any. Instead, the
Court used studies encompassing all previous punitive damages
(resulting from different factual circumstances),23 9 including the
problematic high outliers. 2 40 The Court used that data to determine that
the median ratio of compensatory to punitive damages in these studies
was less than 1:1 .241 The Court then applied a 1:1 ratio to the facts of
Exxon even though it involved mere recklessness-a low level of
culpability.24 2 The Court's analysis in Exxon departed from its previous
hesitance to make any factual comparisons among punitive damage
awards.243
b. Exxon and Tort Law's Injury Requirement
The Court's ultimate suggestion for reform in Exxon, however,
returned to tort law's injury requirement: the Court suggests that
punitive damages be pegged to the amount of compensatory damages. 24
This suggestion heightens the importance of the injury for which the
238. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). After Exxon, appellate
courts have compared punitive damage awards among cases in hopes of achieving consistency and
predictability. See Klass, supra 180, at 193-94 (criticizing the lower courts' comparison of opinions
reviewing punitive damage awards as "arbitrary and haphazard" and problematic due to unreported
decisions). The Court rejected this idea in TXO. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 457.
239. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 497-501; see also id. at 512 ("These studies cover cases of the
most as well as the least blameworthy conduct triggering punitive liability, from malice and avarice,
down to recklessness, and even gross negligence in some jurisdictions."). The Court does not
indicate whether there were an equal number of punitive damage awards for each level of
reprehensibility, which could affect the median. The Court also does not indicate the amounts of the
compensatory damage awards in the cases involved in the studies. If all of the cases involved
modest amounts of compensatory damages or substantial amounts of compensatory damages, that
also should have affected the Court's conclusion that a 1:1 ratio is proper in a case like Exxon that
did not involve a modest amount of compensatory damages. See id. at 512-13.
240. See Sharkey, supra note 63, at 41-42. The Court's statistical analysis in Exxon has been
subject to scholarly derision. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages:
Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 . INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
5, 12-23 (2010); Sharkey, supranote 63, at 41-42.
241. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 512.
242. See id at 513-15.
243. Compare TXO, 509 U.S. at 457 ("[N]o two cases are truly identical, meaningful
comparisons of such [punitive] awards are difficult to make."), with Exxon, 554 U.S. at 512 ("There
is better evidence of an accepted limit of reasonable penalty ... reflecting what juries and judges
have considered reasonable across many hundreds of punitive awards.").
244. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 506.
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defendant is liable in tort because it is the baseline for the damages. And
this is an appropriate level of importance. Tort law-based punishment is
possible only because of liability for that injury and thus, the punishment
should be based on that injury.
The Court's suggested reform also diminishes the importance of
components of its punitive damage jurisprudence that are not related to
the injury.245 The extent of the defendant's reprehensibility, once the
most important guidepost in the Court's constitutional analysis, is
merely a factor to consider when determining the multiplier.246
Similarly, the Court evaluated the criminal sanctions for comparable
conduct only to confirm its already determined 1:1 ratio. 2 47 Admittedly,
Exxon was not a constitutional-based challenged to punitive damages.248
But just as in a constitutional challenge, the Court used the guideposts to
evaluate the award. 24 9 And the Court relegated the guideposts reflecting
a public law view of punitive damages, reprehensibility and criminal
sanctions, to secondary status.
Admittedly, the Court's focus on the actual injury and suggestion to
peg punitive damages to compensatory damages may not have been the
result of a deliberate choice to limit punitive damages according to the
injury. 250 The reasonable relationship guidepost has proven to be the
only one applied easily by the lower courts. 251 Even if it is a convenient,
workable solution, the Court does not appear to be settling. The Court
has never wavered in the relevance of the relationship between the
amount of punitive damages and compensatory damages.252 And this

245. See id.at 503-04.
246. See id. at 512-13.
247. See id. at 514-15. The Court's disregard of the criminal sanctions guidepost is a little
surprising because the Court relied so heavily on the similarities in punitive damages and criminal
punishments in explaining the need to reform punitive damages. Still, the Court looked elsewhereto the plaintiffs actual injury-in fashioning the suggested reform. See id. at 506 (suggesting
pegging punitive damages to the compensatory damage award).
248. Id at 501-02.
249. See id at 513-14 (confirming the 1:1 ratio based on the defendant's low level of
reprehensibility and the substantial amount of compensatory damages, and the Clean Water Act
fines for comparable conduct).
250. See id. at 506 (rejecting the possibility of punitive damage caps because "there is no
'standard' tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle upon a particular dollar figure as
appropriate across the board").
251. See Allen, supra note 135, at 349-50 (discussing the difficulty of applying the
reprehensibility guidepost as opposed to the reasonable relationship between the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages guidepost); see also Sebok, supra note 138, at 1001
(explaining that ratios are attractive because of their simplicity).
252. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 507 ("[T]he potential relevance of the ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages is indisputable. . . .").
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relationship is relevant because tort law's ability to punish wrongdoers is
limited to punishment for causing the injury giving rise to tort liability.
Although the Court has not owned up to it, tort law is influencing
its holdings in punitive damages cases. The Court repeatedly focuses on
the plaintiffs injury in crafting both constitutional and common lawbased limitations on punitive damage awards. What results is a private
law conception of punitive damages-that they are limited to the extent
of punishment and deterrence necessary to resolve the private dispute
between the litigants.
VII.

PREDICTING THE FUTURE: MORE LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS

What does the influence of tort law's injury requirement mean for
the future? Punitive damage awards that exceed that private law
conception, that do more than resolve the dispute between the individual
litigants, will likely be unconstitutional. Thus, punitive damages cannot
constitutionally punish public harm. This means that if no actual injury
exists, any constitutional punitive damage award would likely be
law conception prioritizes
minimal. Similarly, the private
personalization of punitive damage awards over consistency.
A. Impossibility ofPunitive Damages Serving a PublicLaw Function
The Court has not expressly addressed whether punitive damages
can punish the defendant for causing public harm. The answer to this
question is especially important to cases in which the plaintiff lacks an
actual injury; if the award cannot constitutionally encompass public
harm, it will be minimal. The influence of tort law's injury requirement,
however, precludes any constitutional punishment for public harm
within a punitive damage award. This is because the plaintiff lacks an
actual injury, which is the injury that tort law has the capability to
punish.
1. The Conflict Between Philip Morris and Punitive Damages
Serving the State's Interests
The Court's very specific holding in Philip Morris prohibits
punishing the defendant for private harms caused to nonparties who have
their own tort claims against the defendant.2 53 But it does not expressly
address whether punitive damages can punish the defendant for the

253.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).
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254

public harm,
a conclusion that seems consistent with the Court's
public law commentary that serve the state's interests and are similar to
criminal punishments.
At least one lower court has noted this potential conflict. A
Louisiana trial court's jury instructions explained that punitive damages
"protect[] the public interest" and are awarded to "compel the wrongdoer
to have due and proper regard for the rights of the public."25 5 On appeal,
the court acknowledged that the instructions refer to nonparties, which
Philip Morris prohibits for the purpose of punishment.256 But that
reference was "within the context of the public's interest and safety."2 57
The Louisiana Court found no Philip Morris due process violation
because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that punitive damages
serve the public interest; the damages "'further a State's legitimate
2 58
interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."'
Thus, any reference to the public interest within the jury instructions
cannot violate Philip Morris.
The Louisiana Court did not cite it, but the Supreme Court's
constant comparisons of punitive damages to criminal punishments also
support the Louisiana Court's holding. Using punitive damages to
punish the public harm must be constitutional because the Court has
consistently maintained that punitive damages are just like criminal
punishments, especially in Exxon. 2 59 And that is what criminal
punishments do-punish the public harm and protect the public. 26 0
The Louisiana Court's holding is consistent with former Justice
Stevens's dissent in Philip Morris where he described punitive damages
as "a sanction for the public harm the defendant's conduct has caused or
threatened." 26 1 Justice Stevens admits that he sees little difference
254. See Paul B. Rietema, Recent Development, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery Statutes:
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1159, 1167
(2008) ("Although Philip Morris outlawed social-interest theories based around social-harm, it does
not affect social-interest theories based around individual-harm."); but see Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (finding no constitutional violation in jury instructions stating that
purpose of punitive damages is to punish and "protect the public by [deterring] the defendant and
others" from committing the same conduct).
255. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 965 So. 2d 511, 516 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
256. Id. at 517.
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352); see also Markel, supra
note 127, at 1428 (explaining that his proposal of punitive damages to serve the public's interest in
retribution is "exactly what the Supreme Court thinks that punitive damages may lawfully do now:
serve as 'quasi-criminal' sanctions to advance the public interest in retributive justice").
259. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503-05 (2008) (analogizing criminal
sanctions and punitive damages); see also supra Part IV.
260. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
261. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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between punitive damages and criminal punishments,262 which is also
consistent with Exxon. Under Justice Stevens's view, the defendant's
conduct in Philip Morris endangered the public as a whole: the
defendant "engag[ed] in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous
and addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers." 263
Regardless of whether those nonparty smokers could succeed in their
own tort claims against the defendant, punitive damages can
constitutionally punish the defendant for threatening the public's safety.
Justice Stevens articulated his public law view of punitive damages
in his dissent in Philip Morris.264 It does not seem to be a view that the
majority of justices in Philip Morris share. If the majority thought that
punitive damages had the constitutional capacity to serve the public
interest, there would be no reason to limit the punishment to only what
the defendant did to the plaintiff.265
At the same time, the Court's due process rationale in Philip
Morris-the inability to present defenses to the nonparties' tort claims
and the lack of standards in assessing the award-does not mandate a
266
The
rejection of the public law function of punitive damages.
inability-to-present-defenses issue should not arise because public harm
emanates from the defendant's conduct that injured the specific plaintiff
and any defenses to the public harm likely coincide with the defenses to
the conduct to the specific plaintiff. Simpler yet, if punitive damages
encompass public harm, notifying the defendant before the civil trial
would ensure sufficient notice and opportunity. Similarly, there is no

262. Id. at 359.
263. Id. at 360.
264. Id. at 358-59.
265. See Colby, supra note 36, at 413 ("The majority's reasoning makes sense only ifcontrary to Justice Stevens's assertion-punitive damages are not a form of punishment for public
wrongs to society."); Rietema, supra note 254, at 1167 (discussing that Philip Morris did not
preclude punishment for the public harm resulting from harm caused to the plaintiff by the
defendant).
266. In his more recent article, Professor Colby does not (seem to) distinguish between
punishment for multiple private harms versus punishment for multiple public harms-he often
interchanges discussions of multiple private harms to others with discussions of the public harm.
Colby, supra note 36, at 397-98 (discussing the harm caused to an individual plaintiff versus harm
done unto a large population). They are different, however, as multiple private harms are still
actionable in tort, whereas, generally, public harm does not give rise to tort liability. Regardless,
Professor Colby explains that the Philip Morris holding is correct because punishing the defendant
for anything more than the private wrong done to the specific plaintiff would violate due process.
This explanation would prohibit punitive damages from encompassing either the defendant's
causing multiple private harms and/or public harm unless heightened procedural protections
applied. Additionally, in an earlier article, Professor Colby argued that punishment for multiple
private harms and for public harm is unconstitutional because of the historical conception of
punitive damages. See Colby, supra note 200, at 650-55.
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fear of standardless dimensions in that the punitive damage award would
punish just like criminal sanctions for comparable conduct.
2. Tort Law's Inability to Punish Public Harm
Tort law's influence on the Court's constitutional analysis of
punitive damage awards, however, mandates a rejection of the
possibility that punitive damages could fulfill anything more than a
private law function.2 67 A tort cause of action does not arise from public
harm-a particular plaintiff must suffer an injury to bring a tort claim.
Similarly, tort remedies cannot address public harm. This includes even
punitive damages.
Without a finding of liability for an individual injury, tort law is
incapable of punishing a defendant even if his conduct threatens society
and punishment would thus serve the public interest. Take the example
of an assault intentional tort claim. "[T]o shoot at and miss a sleeping
man cannot be a civil assault, as there is no injury, even mental, to the
sleeper; but such behavior is socially dangerous enough to constitute a
criminal assault." 26 8 If punitive damages punished the public harm
created by the defendant's conduct, they should be imposed in this
situation. 269 But the defendant is not liable and tort law lacks the ability
to punish this socially dangerous conduct.
The same holds true with a consent defense to battery: "[T]orts are
wrongs to private individuals but crimes are wrongs to the public. Thus
consent of the adult injured party is a defense to intentionally inflicted
torts; but in analogous situations in the field of criminal law consent of
the victim may not be a defense." 2 70 Again, the defendant's violent
battery endangers society and if punitive damages punished public harm,
a defendant should still be subject to them even if he is not liable in tort
due to consent. But just as with the assault example, tort law lacks the
capability to punish this socially dangerous conduct.271
The fact that tort law's injury requirement impedes the ability of
punitive damages to protect society is apparent in Professor Dan
Markel's introduction of his system of "retributive damages."27 2
267. See supra Part V.B.
268. See LAFAVE & SCorr, supra note 35, § 1.3(b), at 13.
269. See Colby, supra note 200, at 607 ("[If punitive damages truly were punishment for
public wrongs ... it should not be necessary for the plaintiff to prevail on an underlying civil cause
of action in order to receive them.").
270. LAFAVE & ScorT, supra note 35, § 1.3(b), at 14.
271. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 186, at 1138 (explaining that tort law differentiates
between creation of a risk of injury versus causation of actual injury).
272. Professor Markel advocates a pluralistic approach to punitive damages-one approach
being retributive damages. See Markel, supra note 127, at 259-60.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss3/4

44

Lens: Pushing for the Injury: Tort Law's Influence in Defining the Cons

2011]

PUNISHING FOR THE INJURY

639

Professor Markel introduces a punitive damages system that would
achieve the "public'sinterest in retributive justice."273 In his system, one
of the first things Professor Markel does is eliminate the injury
requirement, 274 thus enabling claims despite the lack of an injury. This is
necessary because conduct that does not cause an injury, like drunk
driving or attempted criminal conduct, still poses a risk to the public and
thus must be punishable.2 75 Professor Markel does not address whether
traditional tort claims would need to be rewritten in his retributive
damages scheme. 2 76 But it seems necessary to ensure that the public
interest in punishment is achieved. Otherwise, a defendant could
endanger the public by shooting at a sleeping person and not face any
punishment. Similarly, a defendant could endanger the public by
committing battery and not face any punishment if the victim consented.
Unless these traditional tort claims are rewritten, retributive damages
would not achieve the public's interest in retributive justice.

273. Id. at 246.
274. See id. at 279-80. Professor Markel proposes a pecking order for who would be able to
bring the claim for retributive damages. First, the tort plaintiff actually harmed would have the
choice to bring the claim. See id at 281. If no one was harmed or the plaintiff chose not to bring the
suit, a private attorney general ("PAG") would notify the state of the claim and the state would then
have the opportunity to bring the cause of action. Id. If successful, the PAG would receive a reward
for notifying the state. Id. If the state declined to bring the suit, the PAG would be able to retain an
attorney and bring the claim. Id at 281-82. Professor Markel does not explain how this pecking
order would fit within statutes of limitations. Specifically, he does not explain whether the tort
plaintiff would have less time than the full statute of limitations to choose to bring the claim. It is
not immediately clear how this system would work if a statute of limitations begins to accrue at the
time of the plaintiff's injury or later constructive discovery of the injury.
275. Id. at 279 (explaining that certain "harmless crimes" such as drunk driving are punishable
even when there is no actual harm caused to a plaintiff because the conduct is "worthy of
condemnation"). See also id. at 283 (stating that a plaintiffs choice not to bring a tort claim "not
only risks leaving the state unaware of the defendant's misconduct . .. but it leaves the defendant a
risk to others and possibly again to the victim"). This language is similar to the type of harm that
criminal law punishes. See supranotes 34-37 and accompanying text.
276. Professor Markel admits that "under a traditional torts scheme," in cases without an
injury, "the wrongdoer escapes legal responsibility." Markel, supra note 127, at 283. The dramatic
extent of Professor Markel's suggested reforms alone may demonstrate tort law's inability to
achieve a public law goal without becoming unrecognizable. Owen, supra note 34, at 190
(characterizing Professor Markel's suggested reforms as "radical"). But Professor Markel did not
intend to fit his proposal of retributive damages within tort law constraints. See Markel, supra note
37, at 284 (explaining that his "concern is not tort law's past, or even its present, but its future").
However, Professor Markel argues that his retributive damages system fits within the Supreme
Court's limitations on punitive damages. See Markel, supranote 127, at 327. This Article disagrees:
punitive damages cannot constitutionally punish the public harm because of the heavy influence of
tort law's injury requirement within the constitutional limitations the Court has developed. Because
of that influence, any proposal of punitive damages that strays from tort law's injury constraint
would not be constitutional under the current limitations. Of course, if punitive damages were
completely separated from tort law, as Professor Markel seems to advocate, new constitutional
limitations may develop and likely look similar to those limitations imposed on crimes.
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Simply put, tort law lacks the capability to punish the defendant for
anything other than causing the injury to the individual plaintiff-that
injury enables liability and the capability of punishment. The influence
of tort law's injury requirement means that punitive damages cannot
constitutionally punish the defendant for anything more than causing the
injury to the individual plaintiff. 27 7 Anything more would exceed the
state's limited interests in punishment and deterrence within resolving
the dispute between the private tort litigants.
3. Punitive Damages Without Underlying Compensatory
Damages
Certain intentional torts presume injury. Without an injury,
however, the plaintiff can receive only nominal damages. 278 Some states
allow plaintiffs to recover punitive damages even if the plaintiff recovers
only nominal damages.279 But what can the punitive damages punish? 280
One of the most famous cases allowing punitive damages supported only
by nominal damages is Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,281 in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that a punitive damage award of
282
$100,000 for trespass was not unconstitutionally excessive.
The court purported to evaluate the award under the constitutional
guideposts,283 but declined to apply two of the guideposts. Specifically,
the court declined to compare the punitive damage award to the nominal
damage award because it "may not reflect the actual harm caused." 284
The court also declined to consider the criminal sanction for comparable

277. Practically, lower courts should cease using any jury instructions that incorporate the
public interest. Also, lower courts should exclude evidence of harm to nonparties if procedural
protections are insufficient to help the jury distinguish between considering the evidence for
purposes of reprehensibility versus punishing the defendant for that harm. See supra notes 219-25
and accompanying text (arguing for exclusion of evidence of harm to nonparties under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403).
278. See DOBBS, supra note 57, § 3.3(2), at 296.
279. In the states that require underlying compensatory damages for punitive damages to be
awarded, tort law and punitive damages have an even more limited ability to regulate conduct and
serve the public interest. The defendant has committed an intentional tort, obviously condemnable
conduct, and thus likely endangers society. But in these jurisdictions, tort law still cannot punish the
wrongdoer unless the conduct has caused actual damages, like actual medical expenses. See
generally Part V.A.
280. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari on this issue. Lawnwood Med. Ctr. Inc. v.
Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 719, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 905 (2011).
281. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
282. Id. at 163.
283. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision was not appealed to the Untied States Supreme
Court, which has the final say on the application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
284. Jacque,563 N.W.2d at 164.
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conduct, a maximum $1000 fine, because it was insufficient to deter a
trespasser.2 85
Instead, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on the public
harm caused by the trespass in affirming (and justifying) the award.
"Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional
trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests of the individual
landowner." 286 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's emphasis of the public
harm makes sense. Without it, the punitive damage award seems too
severe because the individual plaintiff suffered no actual injury.
But based on the influence of tort law's injury requirement on the
constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards, punitive damages
cannot punish the defendant for the public harm his conduct caused.
Thus, a constitutional award in Jacques cannot go beyond the interests
of the individual landowner. An award punishing the defendant for
anything more than causing the plaintiff landowner's injury exceeds the
state's limited interest in any punishment and deterrence necessary to
resolve the private dispute between the landowner and trespasser.
Because the plaintiff suffers no actual injury, any constitutional punitive
damage award supported only by nominal damages will likely be
minimal.287
B. At Most, Concernsfor Consistency and Predictabilityare
Secondary
Another conflict that exists in the Court's holdings and its
commentary is between consistency and personalization. The Court's
focus on the plaintiffs injury emphasizes personalization of each
punitive award to the facts of the case, exemplifying a private law view
of punitive damages.288 Exxon, on the other hand, emphasizes
consistency among multiple punitive damages-a goal more common to
public law.2 89 One of these emphases must give. It is not possible to
285. Id. at 165 (commenting that the criminal sanction "failed to deter [defendant's] egregious
misconduct"). In discussing the public's interest in punishing the trespass, the court expounded:
"People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. Punitive damages have the effect of
bringing to punishment types of conduct that, though oppressive and hurtful to the individual,
almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor." Id. at 161. This language is similar to
Professor Markel's proposal for retributive damages to step in for laws that the criminal justice
system underenforces due to "scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources." Markel, supra note
127, at 283.
286. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160.
287. But cf Colby, supra note 36, at 468 (explaining that "eliminating [punitive damages] and
focusing only on the private wrong to the individual victim will result in underdeterrence").
288. See supra Part V.B.2.
289. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008).
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achieve consistency, especially the type of consistency that the federal
sentencing guidelines achieve, if each punitive damage award must be
specific to the facts of the case.
Tort law's influence on the Court's constitutional analysis resolves
this inherent conflict. Any punishment must be specific to the injury that
the defendant caused the plaintiff because tort law's ability to punish
depends on that injury.2 90 Any desires for consistency or predictability
must give way to the need to make each punitive damage award specific
to the plaintiff s injury.
Since Exxon, numerous lower courts have compared punitive
damage awards to those in previous cases. 2 9 1 This must stop-the
propriety of each punitive damage award depends on the facts of each
case. 2 92 Even if levels of culpability are similar, the Court looks to the
injury requirement of tort law in determining the constitutionality of
punitive damage awards and no two injuries, or plaintiffs, are the same.
As the Court stated in TXO, "meaningful comparisons of such awards
are difficult to make" because of their factual dependence. 2 93 The
influence of tort law's injury requirement mandates that this sentiment
remains true today.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has toyed with both public law and private law
conceptions of punitive damage awards. These conceptions can conflict
and lower courts have started to notice, especially after Philip Morris.
The punitive damage award cannot punish the defendant for causing
harm to nonparties, but can it punish the harm that the defendant's
conduct caused to the public as a whole? Philip Morris seems to narrow
the focus to the plaintiffs injury, but the Court has consistently
maintained that punitive damages serve the state's interests in punishing
the wrongdoer to protect the public and are obviously similar to criminal
punishments.

290. See supraParts V.A. and VI.A.2.
291. See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 877 (8th Cir. 2008)
(reducing the punitive award to match comparable cases); see also Klass, supra note 180, at 193
("[S]ince Exxon, courts have carefully surveyed prior opinions reviewing punitive damages verdicts
to ensure their ratios and punitive damages awards are in line with those prior cases.").
292. Both the reasonable relationship guidepost and Exxon itself note that the proper ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages depends on the specifics of the case. Regardless of
reprehensibility, the amount of the compensatory damage itself can mandate a smaller ratio. See
Exxon, 554 U.S. at 506.
293. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993).
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This conflict is especially problematic for punitive damage awards
supported only by nominal damages. The injury to the plaintiff is
presumed, but is practically non-existent. Any significant punitive
damage award looks like it does more than resolve the private dispute
between the parties, a dispute that did not even involve an actual injury.
This should not be an issue if the damages have the capacity to serve a
public law function.
The Court's most recent opinion in Exxon further exemplifies the
differing conceptions, but in a different way. The Court's focus was to
reform punitive damages to make them more predictable and thus more
consistent among tort cases. This is similar to the consistency among
criminal punishments, which punishes the public harm instead of the
individual injury. But Philip Morris mandates that the award be specific
to the plaintiffs injury, which will differ in each tort claim. What is
more important-consistency or specificity?
Tort law is a proper place to look for answers; the influence of tort
law's injury requirement is evident in the Court's opinions. The Court
has repeatedly returned to the plaintiffs injury in crafting both
constitutional and common law-based limitations on punitive damage
awards. This makes sense because tort law lacks the capacity to punish
without liability and liability cannot exist unless the defendant caused
the plaintiff an injury. The injury enables punitive damages and the
damages should thus encompass only that individual injury.
Constitutionally then, punitive damages can punish the defendant only
for causing the plaintiffs injury.
Punitive damages cannot constitutionally punish the defendant for
causing public harm. Punitive damages encompassing public harm do
more than is justified by the limited state interest in resolving the private
dispute between the individual litigants. Contrary to some of the Court's
previous statements, punitive damages do differ from criminal
punishments as punitive damages cannot punish public harm.
Because punitive damages cannot constitutionally punish the
defendant for causing public harm, any punitive damage award should
be minimal when supported only by nominal damages. This is a
necessary result because no actual injury occurred, leaving little for
punitive damages to punish. The limited scope of punishment also
mandates that any concerns for consistency in punitive damage awards
must give way to the need to ensure that a punitive damage award
resolves the specific dispute.
Thus, if a defendant shoots a gun into a movie theater and injures
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be able to recover punitive damages in her
battery claim against the defendant. But to be constitutional, those
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punitive damages must only punish the defendant for the injury he
caused to the plaintiff. It is true that the defendant's conduct endangered
others in the movie theater and society as a whole. But tort law's
influence on the constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards
mandates that the award be specific to the injury that enables the tort
claim-the injury to the individual plaintiff.
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